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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON SOCIAL INTERACTION AND URBAN OUTCOMES
BY
ZACKARY BARTHOLOMEW HAWLEY
MARCH 2012
Committee Chair: Dr. Jonathan C. Rork
Major Department: Economics
This dissertation consists of two essays. The connecting theme for this body of
work is social interaction. I dene social interaction, for this dissertation, as non-
market based face-to-face interaction between individuals where each is interested
in a response. Non-market based means, for example, the individual is not trying
to negotiate a price of a good or a labor contract, but is merely interested in the
others input, company, or friendship. Within the dissertation, I examine the rela-
tionship between social interaction and local area population density and the e¤ect
of social interaction on the urban consumers location and housing consumption de-
cision.
The rst contribution investigates the relationship between social interaction and
neighborhood population density. Understanding the causal impact on social inter-
actions from a change in neighborhood density is a challenging empirical question;
the choice of location for the individual may include a desire for population density
or social interaction, or, most likely, both. I address endogeneity or simultaneity
using an instrumental variables technique. I use the exogenous variation in a set
of geological instruments to predict the neighborhood population density. The in-
struments include seismic hazard, landslide hazard, and the presence of sedimen-
tary rock beneath the soil. These instruments e¤ect population density through
the types of structures that are placed on top of the land. The results suggest that
x
an increase in neighborhood population density increases some types of social in-
teraction. Friends interaction increases as population density rises, but neighbor
interaction falls with increases in population density. Group involvement appears
to have no consistent signicant e¤ect from a change in population density. This
implies a need for theoretical models involving social interaction to be exible to
di¤ering types of social interaction.
The second contribution brings social interaction into a standard urban con-
sumer theory model, the Alonso-Muth model. I start by outlining the canonical
model and providing intuition for the inclusion of social interaction. Social interac-
tion is allowed to take multiple forms in the model; interaction can be exogenously
or endogenously determined across an area, increase or decrease with population
density, or be a substitute or complement to housing consumption. This exibil-
ity provides multiple cases and sub-cases of how social interaction could appear in
reality. I capture the e¤ects of changes in social interaction on housing demand
and location choice with a number of comparative statics. Lastly, I examine the
predictions of the endogenous social interaction model with empirical data. The
empirical results buttress the theoretical models predictions.
xi
11 INTRODUCTION
Face-to-face interaction among individuals residing relatively close within space
is a central component to the existence of cities. The gathering of individuals in
space provides many advantages. Alfred Marshall proposes "if one man starts a
new idea, it is taken up by others and combined with suggestions of their own; and
thus it becomes the source of further new ideas"; the ideas he discusses get moved
from one neighborhood to another "as it were in the air" (Alfred Marshall (1890),
IV.X.3). The mechanism for individuals exchanging these ideas or creating knowl-
edge spillovers within cities is very likely face-to-face interaction.
While Marshall was mostly interested in rm location choice and innovations,
the notion of social interaction also plays an important role in the lives of urban
residents. Social interaction is face-to-face interaction among individuals that is
non-market based; this type of interaction is not determining the price of a good
or negotiating a labor contract but the exchange of social pleasantries or friend-
ship, for example. The importance of social interaction is not overlooked in eco-
nomics; during the last twenty years, the economics literature has examined social
activity, be it peer e¤ects1, neighborhood e¤ects2, social capital3, etc. Social inter-
action, however, is unique since it is likely the mechanism that derives these social
activities. The link between social interaction and economic outcomes, particularly
urban growth or urban consumer decision making, is not yet obvious or concrete
in the literature. The di¢ culty of analyzing social interaction is mainly the lack
of data on individuals preferences for social involvement or interaction, a problem
stated by Manski (2000) and eluded to by Putnam (2000).
Within this dissertation, I examine the relationship between social interaction
and local area population density and the e¤ect of social interaction on the urban
1See Bayer, Hjalmarsson and Pozen (2009) for a review of peer e¤ects.
2For example, see Ioannides and Topa (2010).
3For example, see Sobel (2002).
2consumers location and housing consumption decision. In the rst chapter, I use
variation in local population density, predicted by exogenous changes in a set of
geological variables, to predict e¤ects on social interaction. The a priori expec-
tation of this relationship is that social interaction and neighborhood population
density are positively related. As the number of people increases within a close
space around the individual, the prevalence of social interaction is expected to rise.
This positive relationship assumption is proposed in the urban economics litera-
ture and leads to various outcomes such as urban sprawl (Brueckner and Largey,
2008) or increased interactivity within the economy as a whole (Helsley and Zenou,
2011). The empirical results show the type of social interaction is critical in deter-
mining the relationship with population density. Friends interaction increases with
population density, as expected; however, neighbor interaction decreases and group
involvement is constant with changes in local population density. These di¤ering
outcomes suggest that not all social interaction should be modeled in the same
way.
In the second chapter, I formulate a new social interaction model which builds
onto the Alonso-Muth model, a canonical model in urban consumer theory. The
social interaction model provides insight to the literature on the e¤ect of various
forms of social interaction on the decision of location and housing consumption. So-
cial interaction is allowed to take multiple forms in the model; interaction can be
exogenously or endogenously determined across an area, increase or decrease with
population density, and be a substitute or complement to housing consumption.
The formulation of the model proceeds in steps allowing the assumptions surround-
ing social interaction to be more exible, thus retaining the ability to produce pre-
dictions of the e¤ects from changes in various forms of social interaction on the ur-
ban consumers location and housing demand choices. The culminating theme of
the predictions of the social interaction model is that when social interaction is a
3substitute to housing consumption, individuals move closer in toward the center of
the city and demand less housing, but if social interaction is a complement to hous-
ing, then individuals will locate further from the center of the city and consume
more housing.
Lastly, I empirically test these predictions of the model. The results yield strong
support for the theoretical model. The main source of social interaction data is
the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey. The structure of the survey is
such that it is collected through communities, so the data include a national sam-
ple and 41 separate community samples. Information is collected on general social
interaction, trust, religious involvement, civic participation, diversity of friendship,
happiness, feelings of safety, among others.
42 DOES URBAN DENSITY PROMOTE SOCIAL INTERACTION?
Introduction
Over the last two decades, the amount of land used in U.S. urban areas has in-
creased by 2.76 times that of population growth.4 This staggering di¤erence is an
indication of urban sprawlcity boundaries expanding while population density de-
creases. Urban sprawl is often described in the literature as a response to income
growth or reduced transportation costs (Brueckner and Fansler, 1983; Brueckner,
2000, 2001; Glaeser and Kahn, 2003; Nechyba and Walsh, 2004). Sprawl can also
be seen as an ine¢ cient individual response to a market action;5 this portion of the
literature provides evidence that shows increased pollution, failing public services,
congestion, obesity, and even exacerbated drought problems are consequences of
sprawl (Squires, 2002).6 A vast literature addresses which type of policy is best for
curbing sprawl (Anas and Rhee, 2007; Anas and Pines, 2008; Irwin and Bockstael,
2004) and examines indirect e¤ects of other policies on sprawl (Su and DeSalvo,
2008; Brueckner and Kim, 2003; Brueckner, 2005; Song and Zenou, 2006). Despite
mounting evidence, urban sprawls underlying causes and social e¢ ciency are de-
batable.
I examine a causal link between a density externality, created by social interac-
tion, and urban sprawl. The density externality is derived from the e¤ect of lot
size choice on neighbors social interaction. An individual chooses a lot size to
maximize utility but fails to incorporate the e¤ect on his neighborschange in social
4See OSullivan (2007).
5These ine¢ ciencies are occasionally argued to be allocated to reduced housing prices for the
individuals who reside in the a¤ected areas. Housing prices are thought to adjust to the sur-
rounding externalitiesand, internal to the housing market, solve the ine¢ ciencies (Li and Brown,
1980).
6The Urban Institute released an 11 paper review of urban sprawl and several issues including
those mentioned and more. Plantinga and Bernell (2007) and Eid et al. (2008) both discuss the
relationship between obesity and sprawl.
5interaction from his consumption of land. Brueckner and Largey (2008) theoreti-
cally model this density externality and nd social interaction causes urban sprawl.
The existing empirical results, however, do not support the models assumption;
therefore, they conclude social interaction does not cause urban sprawl. I start
with a similar theoretical framework that also illustrates the same resultchoice of
lot size creates a density externality that ultimately leads to urban sprawl. I use
a more rened set of instruments, and I nd evidence of social interaction causing
urban sprawl, in contrast with the previous ndings.
Using data from the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey (SCCBS),
which provides information on social interaction, I estimate the relationship be-
tween local population density and social interaction. The causal direction of the
relationship between population density and social interaction is confounded since
density and interaction are likely to be simultaneously determined. To solve this
endogeneity issue, I instrument for local population density using earthquake and
landslide hazard rates in addition to the presence of hard rock beneath the soil.
The identication strategy assess the validity of the theoretical models assump-
tion of a positive relationship between social interaction and local population den-
sity that is required for social interaction, working through a density externality, to
cause urban sprawl.
Additionally, I use factor analysis to create social interaction index measures
which allow for a bundle of interactions to be examined simultaneously. These in-
dexes are new to the literature and map several components of social interaction
into a single index measure, allowing for variation within separate estimates to be
condensed into one factor measure. I use the indexes as measures of social interac-
tion to empirically test the theoretical models assumption.
I nd the assumption that social interaction strictly increases with population
density only holds for particular types of social interaction, but not all. Social
6interaction involving friends increases with population density, but neighbor and
group social interaction declines with increased density. Additionally, I nd a neg-
ative relationship between index measures of social interaction and population den-
sity.
The remainder of the paper continues as follows. Section 2 describes a theoret-
ical link between social interaction and urban sprawl. Section 3 states the iden-
tication strategy for the empirical methods. Section 4 discusses the data used.
Section 5 presents the empirical ndings. The nal section concludes.
Theoretical Model of Social Interaction and Urban Sprawl
Social interaction or other terms used by economists such as peer e¤ects7, neigh-
borhood e¤ects8 or social capital, lack a solid economic denition (Manski, 2000).
I dene social interaction as non-market originating, reoccurring, yet unique, face-
to-face interaction where both parties are interested in a response. In urban eco-
nomics, social interaction is a pillar for the existence of cities. Glaeser and Got-
tlieb (2006, p. 1275) state "cities make it easier to interact, and one of the main
advantages of dense, urban areas is that they facilitate social interactions." There
is also a growing literature on the e¤ect of social interaction on the shape of cities.
Gasper and Glaeser (1998) suggest cities will no longer exist if technological ad-
vancements remove the need for face-to-face interaction; the authors, however, nd
cities will continue to exist, since face-to-face interaction and technological advance-
ments are not strong substitutes. More recently, Helsley and Zenou (2011) theoret-
ically describe how the shape of cities is determined by social networks and their
7Peer e¤ects are generally thought to be changes in behavior due to exposure to other ideas
put forth by co-workers, friends, fellow students, etc. Social interactions may be the channel in
which peer e¤ects occur but the measurement of these two ideas are di¤erent. See Bayer, Hjal-
marsson and Pozen (2009) for a review of peer e¤ects.
8I argue that there is a distinct di¤erence between social interaction and neighborhood e¤ects
neighborhood e¤ects are exogenous after location is chosen, where social interaction is still endoge-
nously determined even after location is chosen.
7central players.
Along these veins, I present a theoretical model in which social interaction is tied
to the actions of others, particularly, lot size choice. In this model, the decision-
maker is the individual who must decide, among other things, how much land to
consume. The range of lots available to the individual is expansive. Each lot is ar-
bitrarily clustered together in space within a neighborhood that surrounds a central
business district (CBD). These separate neighborhoods are dened by a distance
and direction away from the CBD. The individual consumes land directly, with
housing capital suppressed, therefore as lot size increases utility increases. This
abstracts from the notion of buying a smaller lot yet consuming nicer housing ma-
terials in order to gain a higher level of utility.
Let each decision-maker is lot size be denoted as xi. The individual also cares
about non-land consumption, yi, and social interaction, Ii, and maximizes a well
behaved utility function U(xi; yi; Ii). Within each neighborhood, preferences for all
individuals are identical. This can be supported by a Tiebout type sorting model
where each neighborhood provides the exact bundle of public goods to satisfy res-
identspreferences. Thus, the preference for social interaction, I, is also uniform
across the neighborhood. I assume the level of social interaction is determined by
the average population density in the neighborhood since the surrounding popula-
tion increases the availability and relative closeness of possible social interaction.
Ii = f(
n
A
); (1)
where, n is the number of neighbors and A is the area of the neighborhood. The
theoretical model assumes that f is a monotonic function of density. However, it
is likely that at some level of extremely high density social interaction is not made
better by adding more people. One can think of search costs to nding a good so-
8cial interaction match as reason for this phenomenon. This scenario is only likely
when density is su¢ ciently high; therefore, the majority of the neighborhoods will
not experience this type of reversal. The neighborhoods area is dened as the to-
tal amount of land consumed in a neighborhood
A =
nX
j=1;j2N
xj: (2)
Land is available at a xed price, P , within a neighborhood. The consumer then
faces a budget constraint
Pxi + yi = m; (3)
where the price of non-housing consumption is normalized to unity and m is gross
income. Each individual then solves
max
xi;yi;Ii
U(xi; yi; Ii) s:t: Pxi + yi = m; Ii = f(
n
A
) (4)
holding neighborsdecisions constant and known. Using the knowledge about the
area of the neighborhood and the social interaction constraint, the problem is sim-
plied to a choice of only lot size,
max
xi
U [xi;m  Pxi; f(n=
nX
j=1;j2N
xj)]: (5)
The rst order condition yields the optimal amount of land to consume
 PUy + Ux   UI nf
0
(
Pn
j=1;j2N xj)
2
= 0; (6)
where the subscripts denote partial derivatives. Since all consumers are identical,
the rst order condition is symmetric for all individuals in the neighborhood. This
9results in an Nash equilibrium that is symmetric, with
P
xj = nx, where x is the
common lot size. Using the symmetry requirement, the rst order condition is re-
written as
 PUy + Ux   UI nf
0
(nx)2
= 0 =)
 PUy + Ux   UI f
0
nx2
= 0 =)
Ux
Uy
= P +
UI
Uy
f 0
nx2
: (7)
This denes the optimal solution of x for the individual consumer.
If, however, the e¢ cient or socially optimal choice of x is desired, the assumption
of symmetry must be made at the onset of the problem. Thus, maximizing the
utility of a representative consumer,
max
x
U(x;m  Px; f( 1
x
)); (8)
which gives a rst order condition of
Ux
Uy
= P +
UI
Uy
f 0
x2
: (9)
When comparing the result of equation (7) to that of equation (9), the di¤er-
ence becomes a factor of 1=n. In most cases, this factor implies the social opti-
mum choice of lot size to be smaller than the "market" solution; therefore, if left
to decide on their own, individuals over consume land. The solution of ine¢ cient
lot size choice is assured if the marginal rate of substitution between x and y is as-
sumed to not be a¤ected by social interaction. The over consumption of land leads
to the neighborhood being ine¢ ciently large, but urban sprawl occurs when the re-
sult is replicated across all neighborhoods within the urban area. If the assumption
10
of a positive relationship between social interaction and density, f 0 > 0, doesnt
hold, the social optimum could be exactly equal to or much larger than the "mar-
ket" solution. I test this restriction on the model with empirical data.
Brueckner and Largey (2008) use a similar theoretical model. They examine
the urban area as one single unit and makes city-wide assumptions such as non-
existence of a central business district (CBD), identical preferences, and uniform
housing price. I alter their model to ease the acuteness of these restrictions which
make the transition to the empirical model easier and more closely represents an
actual urban housing market. In particular, I adjust the level of spatial geography
implemented in the analysis from city to neighborhood. The movement to neigh-
borhoods allows the model to rely on a CBD as the glue to hold the city together;
without one there is no reference from which to expand away. Further, sorting by
neighborhoods relaxes the city-wide identical preference and equal land (housing)
price restriction. The narrowing in scope is especially helpful since the empirical
framework also uses a more restrictive geographical denition (the census tract)
which I refer to as a neighborhood.
Identication Strategy
The theory indicates social interaction is determined by the local population
density. At the same time, the choice of density is likely to be determined by the
demand for social interaction. The question is whether the individual chooses a
level of social interaction in response to the density surrounding them; or, the in-
dividual selects a density that matches the social interaction desired? The answer
to both is probably "yes." This is the classic simultaneity problem, and the result-
ing inference on an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model leads to inconsistent re-
sults. Additionally, the potential for omitted variables to occur in explaining social
interaction, such as the desire to be friendly or innate friendliness, is high. I use
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instrumental variable estimation to obtain consistent estimates of local population
densitys e¤ect on social interaction, as well as to correct for any omitted variables
bias.
The set of instruments includes a measure of seismic hazard, landslide hazard,
and the presence of sedimentary rock under the soil. The seismic hazard instru-
ment measures how potentially strong and likely seismic activity is for a location.
More precisely, the instrument measures the maximal horizontal acceleration of the
earth as a multiple (or percentage) of gravity, or the potential severity of an earth-
quake; there is correlation between potential severity and probability of occurrence.
The intuition for this instrument is that, as the seismic hazard increases, building
becomes more complicated and costly from fear of instability, lowering the pop-
ulation density. The variables range is from 0 to 100, and does not correspond
directly with census tracts. Thus, the census tract measure is the area weighted
average of the scores located inside the tract.
One complication with the seismic hazard instrument is that all of the high (30
or over) scores are located on the west coast. I create two additional instrumental
variables using the seismic hazard rate: a tract level dummy variable indicating a
high value for the hazard rate9, and an interaction with the dummy variable and
the original seismic variableto avoid the seismic hazard rate being confounded with
a regional e¤ect. This allows the trend for building in the west coast to vary from
the overall e¤ect on building as the hazard increases.
The landslide hazard measure takes values of low, medium, and high (1, 2, and
3, respectively) and represents how likely a landslide is to occur. The story sup-
porting this instrument is if the area is prone to landslides, the inhabitants are less
likely to build upon that land for fear of losing their homes. The landslide hazard
instrument is calculated at the census tract level as an area weighted average of its
9The dummy equals unity if the area weighted seismic hazard score is above or equal to 30,
zero otherwise.
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values.
The last geological instrument is the percentage of area within a census tract in
which sedimentary bedrock is found. The type of rock found deep in the earth is
important for determining the type of structure that is placed on top of the ground.
The harder the rock the higher and larger the structures potential. Since high
density areas need large and tall structures to house masses of people, the type of
rock can determine the feasibility or ease of such housing. Rosenthal and Strange
(2008) use a similar set of instruments to obtain consistent estimates of the e¤ect
density has on labor market outcomes.
The instrumental variable technique relies on the instruments, themselves, not
directly inuencing the level of social interaction except through their e¤ect on
population density. The instruments are naturally occurring and it is di¢ cult to
link social interaction with them except through their e¤ect on density. This exo-
geneity is what makes them excellent instruments. Further, the instruments have
both inter and intra urban area variation. If one thinks the level of social inter-
action in an urban area depends upon its natural structure, then the inter-area
variation within the instruments confound the estimated relationship. The instru-
ments, however, describe intra-area variation and account for local density di¤er-
ences within the urban area.
The previous literature lacks exogenously determined instrumental variables.
Brueckner and Largey (2008) use urban area density, metropolitan area density and
urban fringe ruggedness to instrument for density to estimate the relationship be-
tween social interaction and population density. These instruments do not seem
plausibly exogenous because the population density of the urban area and MSA are
a¤ected by the local density externality. If it is assumed the level of social inter-
action is determined by the local density, and that density creates an externality,
when replicated throughout the urban area or MSA the city-wide population den-
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sity is also a¤ected. Further, if the argument is made that census tract density is
a determinate of social interactions, then a similar connection could be drawn be-
tween an urbanized area or MSA density and social interaction. The previous lit-
erature also relies solely on inter-area variation in the instruments. The individuals
within the same urban area, therefore, all have identical values for the instruments,
with no variation to explain intra-area di¤erences. This implies sprawl is identi-
ed as an urban area phenomenon; however, the theoretical and empirical strategy
assumes it to be more localized and replicated throughout the MSA or urban area.
I consistently test the relationship between social interaction and local popula-
tion density using an instrumental variables approach. If a positive relationship is
found, this supports the theoretical models predictionurban sprawl is ine¢ cient
city growth caused by social interaction through a density externality. The instru-
mental variables technique is performed in two stages. I instrument for density in
the rst stage,
Tract Densityi = +
GIsi +  X i + "i (10)
where GIs is the set of geological instruments. The coe¢ cients of interest in the
rst stage are represented by the vector 
, or the e¤ect of the instruments on tract
density. I expect a negative relationship with density for the seismic hazard, seis-
mic interaction and landslide hazard and a positive relationship for the high seismic
indicator and sedimentary rock instrument.
A vector of other control variables, X i, includes socioeconomic variables such
as age, income, marital status, children, race, and others.10 Regional dummies are
also used in the specication and are included in X i. The remaining estimates,  
and , are the marginal e¤ects of the other control variables and a constant, respec-
10The full list of additional controls is as follows: gender, age, age squared, marital status, num-
ber of kids, income, education, race, ethnicity, employment, citizenship, tenure in neighborhood,
MSA murder rate, MSA dissimilarity index, and census region dummy variables.
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tively.
Assuming the rst stage is identied correctly, the second stage of the estimation
consistently describes the link between social interaction and density.
SocInteri = 1 + 1  ^Tract Densityi +  1X i + "1 (11)
The coe¢ cient of interest is 1 which tests the assumption made in the theoreti-
cal model. The theoretically driven expectation is a positive relationshipas den-
sity increases the social interaction of individuals also increases. Again the control
variables, X i, are included in the full specications with their marginal e¤ects rep-
resented by the vector of coe¢ cients  1. The dependent variables are friends and
neighbor, group involvement, and index measures of social interaction which are
described below.
Data
Social interaction is ubiquitous within the urban area, but hard to measure em-
pirically. I use data from the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey (SC-
CBS). The survey took place in 2000 and is distributed by the Roper Center for
Public Opinion Research at the University of Connecticut.11 The survey was de-
signed by the Saguaro Seminar at the John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University with the intention of formulating a uniform measure of social
capital.
These data include a national sample as well as 41 separate "community" sam-
ples. The national sample includes just over 3000 respondents, which were chosen
at random across the Continental U.S. with over-sampling of blacks and Hispan-
ics.12 As for the 41 "communities," each separate community is dened di¤erent
11Access to the unrestricted data can be found through www.roper.uconn.edu.
12Blacks and Hispanics account for 500 respondents each which resulted in an additional 288
15
across space; some "communities" capture a single city, while others encompass en-
tire states.13 Because the community samples are sponsored by di¤erent institu-
tions or individuals, the sampling techniques are not uniform across the communi-
ties.14 The total number of observations in the data set is just under 30,000.
I concentrate on individuals that reside within an urban area, since the objec-
tive is analyzing social interaction and urban sprawl. In the restricted use SCCBS,
each individuals location is dened by the census tract for which the home is lo-
cated. An urbanized area is dened by the Census Bureau and can include all or
any size portion of the census tracts that make up the urban area; therefore, a re-
spondent is in the sample if the tract in which he resides intersects at any point
with an urbanized area. About 21,500 observations satisfy these conditions, the
samples vary slightly for the di¤erent social interaction measures because of missing
values.15 The observations fall within 311 separate urbanized areas.
The SCCBS collects data through phone interviews where respondents share ex-
periences about trust, friendship and social activities. I focus on the questions that
address social information or non-market exchange. These select questions measure
how interactive the respondents are within their respective community. The ten
social interaction dependent variables, SocInteri, are broken into two categories,
friendship and group involvement.
I use six di¤erent measures of friendship. First, how often the respondent social-
izes with his neighbors (NEISOC). Second, if the respondent talks with a neigh-
bor more than once a week (NEITALK). Third, how many people in which the
blacks and 294 Hispanics in the sample than otherwise would have been under random sampling.
13As an example, Atlanta is dened as a community which includes counties that are in the
MSA where as Indiana is dened as a community which includes respondents selected random
across the entire state.
14There are several di¤erent sampling techniques used across the communities. One commu-
nity may sample heavier in Hispanics while another oversamples Native Americans. The sponsor
of the community sample may have been interested in a particular group of people and required
more information from that group.
15There is one exception, NEICOOP, or working together with neighbors to get something xed
or improved, which is missing a signicant amount of responses.
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respondent can conde (CONFIDE). Fourth, how many "close" friends the respon-
dent has (FRIENDS). Fifth, how often the respondent "hangs out" in public places
with friends (SOCPUBLIC). Last, how often friends visit the respondents home
(SOCHOME).
Four variables capture group involvement. First, if the respondent is involved in
a neighborhood cooperation (NEICOOP). Second, if the respondent participates in
a hobby-oriented club (GRPHOB). Third, how often the respondent went to any
club meeting (CCLUBMET). Last, the number of non-church groups in which the
respondent is involved (GRPINVLV).
Additionally, the survey includes several index variables. These indexes are gen-
erated from the information provided by the respondents found in the survey, not
necessarily including the social interaction measures above. I use four indexes: so-
cial trust (SOCTRUST), faith-based interaction (FAITHBAS), civic participation
(CIVICPART), and friendship diversity (DIVERSITY).
The social trust index attempts to capture the broad notion of trust in others.
General interpersonal trust, trusting neighbors, trusting police and others help com-
prise this index. This index may be the furthest from social interaction as I de-
ned it, but trust is pivotal in the determination of interaction. The respondent
who does not trust his neighbors is probably much less prone to interact with them.
Faith-based interaction includes church membership, and attending church service.
The civic participation index comprises various interactions dealing with local poli-
tics and community activitiesattending a political meeting or rally, work on a com-
munity project, and demonstrating, protesting, boycotting or marching. This in-
dex is most in line with the types of individual forms of social interaction used in
this paper. Friendship diversity measures how many di¤erent types of people a re-
spondent considers friends. The types of friends include several categories based on
race, ethnicity, employment status, being a community leaders, etc.
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I also create my own indexes from the ten social interaction components de-
scribed above. The method used to create the indexes condenses the variation
across several variables into several factor loadings. I use these loadings to pre-
dict a single factor measure which becomes the index measure. Instead of looking
directly at specic means of interacting, all of the index measures provide an alter-
native way to examine how general social interaction is related to tract population
density. The index (FACTOR) implements factor analysis to create one index from
all ten social interaction components. The second created index (FACTOR2) ex-
cludes the respondents involvement in a neighborhood cooperation since this vari-
able has a large number of missing observations.
The instrument data come from the United States Geological Survey (USGS).
The information is readily found through their website as boundary les and is
downloadable in shapele format. These data are overlaid with census tract bound-
ary shapeles to calculate the area weighted scores for each instrumental variable at
the tract level. Figures 1-3 show examples of each map from which the instruments
are derived. Figure 1 shows a seismic hazard map of Los Angeles, California. This
map demonstrates the variation in the seismic hazard instrument (the range is from
0 to 100). The seismic gradients do not follow exactly the census tract boundaries,
so I create an area weighted average of the seismic score for each census tract which
constitute the seismic hazard instrument. The values of the instrument measure
take the same range as the seismic hazard rate. The instrument, however, is not
an integer scale. Figure 2 presents a landslide hazard map of Atlanta, Georgia. In
this map, the landslide hazard displays its full range. The landslide hazard instru-
ment constructed is the area weighted average of the values. Again, the range for
the landslide hazard instrument is identical to the landslide hazard (1 to 3), but
the instrument is no longer in integer form. Figure 3 displays a sedimentary rock
map for Boston, Massachusetts. As shown, the presence of sedimentary rock does
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not coincide with the drawing of census tracts. This map provides better insight
into how the instruments are constructed. Each census tract is subdivided into
two categoriessedimentary rock and non-sedimentary rock. Then the area of each
is calculated and the ratio to the complete census tract area is taken. The con-
struction leads to a range of values for the sedimentary rock instrument from 0 to
1, with non-integers values possible.
Table 1 provides a description of the full set of variables. The variables of inter-
est are the social interaction terms described above as well as the population den-
sity of each tract, in natural log form. The social interaction measures are categor-
ical or binary responses; this complicates the intuition for the magnitudes. For ex-
ample, the average level of socializing at home is 21.95 which corresponds to around
twice a month. Alternatively, almost 54 percent of the individuals in the sample
talks with or visits immediate neighbors at least once a week.
The descriptive table shows respondents in the sample are 41 percent male, 56
percent married, 37 percent college graduates, 15 percent black, 15 percent retired
and on average 44 years of age. The average seismic hazard rate for the sample
is just over a score of 11. Respondents reside in a high seismic hazard area (score
of 30 or above) in about 16 percent of the sample. The average landslide hazard
rate is 1.5, and the average tract in the sample has 83 percent of its area with sedi-
mentary bedrock beneath the soil. The additional controls include some data from
other sources. The murder rate is taken from the Federal Bureau of Investigations
Uniform Crime Reports and is recorded at the MSA level. The dissimilarity index
captures how racially segregated the population is within a MSA which comes from
Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdors data website.16
16The dissimilarity index was found at http://trinity.aas.duke.edu/~jvigdor/segregation/index.html.
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Figure 1: Seismic Hazard Map of Los Angeles, California
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Figure 2: Landslide Hazard Map of Atlanta, Georgia
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Figure 3: Sedimentary Rock Map of Boston, Massachusetts
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Table 1: Summary Statistics and Variable Denitions
Variable Denition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Social Interaction Variables
#NEITALK
How often respondent talks with or visits 5.061 1.848 1 7
immediate neighbors.
NEITALK
=1 if respondent talks or visits immediate 0.539 0.498 0 1
neighbors at least once a week, 0 otherwise.
CONFIDE Number of people in which respondent can conde. 3.550 0.787 1 4
FRIENDS Number of close friends. 3.317 1.063 1 5
SOCPUBLIC
Number of times per year respondent hangs 16.968 20.147 0 60
out with friends in a public place.
SOCHOME
Number of times per year respondent visits 21.975 21.214 0 60
with friends at home.
NEICOOP
=1 if respondent has worked with neighbors 0.318 0.466 0 1
to get something xed or improved.
HOBBYCLUB
=1 if respondent participates in a hobby, 0.262 0.440 0 1
investment or garden club.
CLUBMTGS
Number of times per year respondent 6.195 12.163 0 60
attends club meetings.
#GROUPS
Number of types of non-religious organizations 3.041 2.620 0 17
to which respondent belongs.
Social Interaction Indexes
FACTOR Factor analysis of the ten social interactions above. 0 0.890 -1.7 1
FACTOR2
Factor analysis of nine social interactions, leaving 0 0.888 -1.6 1
out NEICOOP due to missing values.
SOCTRUST Index of social trust. -0.011 0.697 -2.6 1
FAITHBAS Index of faith-based interactions. -0.087 0.770 -1.1 1.7
CIVICPART Index of political and community involvement. 1.763 1.276 0 5
DIVERSITY Index of diversity in friendships. 6.378 2.669 0 11
Population Density Measure
TRACT DENSITY
Natural log of census tract population 8.029 1.343 0.9 12.3
density: people per square mile.
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 1 Summary Statistics and Variable Denitions Continued
Variable Denition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Instruments for Density
SEISMIC HAZARD
Hazard rate of seismic activity in potential 11.610 19.372 0 90.6
and magnitude.
HIGH SEISMIC =1 if seismic hazard rate is 30 or above. 0.165 0.371 0 1
SEISMIC INTER. Interaction term of high seismic and seismic hazard. 8.672 20.304 0 90.6
LANDSLIDE Hazard rate of landslide activity. 1.573 0.693 1 3
SED. ROCK
Percentage of sedimentary rock found below 0.833 0.359 0 1
the surface of the earth.
Respondent Characteristics
MALE =1 if respondent is male, 0 otherwise. 0.414 0.493 0 1
AGE Age in years. 44.042 16.592 18 99
AGE2 AGE squared.
MARRD/PARTN
=1 if respondent is married or living with 0.564 0.496 0 1
partner, 0 otherwise.
KIDS6 Number of children in household under six years old. 0.266 0.685 0 8
KIDS6_17
Number of children in household between 0.489 0.920 0 8
six and seventeen.
INC2 =1 if $20k < annual household income < $30k. 0.123 0.328 0 1
INC3 =1 if $30k < annual household income < $50k . 0.217 0.412 0 1
INC4 =1 if $50k < annual household income < $75k . 0.173 0.378 0 1
INC5 =1 if $75k < annual household income < $100k. 0.102 0.302 0 1
INC6 =1 if annual household income > $100k. 0.117 0.322 0 1
SOMECOLL
=1 if respondent has completed some college 0.323 0.468 0 1
education, 0 otherwise.
COLLGRAD =1 if respondent has a college degree, 0 otherwise. 0.374 0.484 0 1
BLACK =1 if respondent is black, 0 otherwise. 0.150 0.357 0 1
HISPANIC =1 if respondent is Hispanic, 0 otherwise. 0.092 0.288 0 1
ASIAN =1 if respondent is Asian, 0 otherwise. 0.031 0.173 0 1
UNEMP =1 if respondent is unemployed, 0 otherwise . 0.026 0.160 0 1
HOMEMAKER =1 if respondent is a home-maker, 0 otherwise. 0.062 0.241 0 1
RETIRED =1 if respondent is retired, 0 otherwise. 0.149 0.356 0 1
CITIZEN =1 if respondent is a US citizen, 0 otherwise. 0.935 0.246 0 1
LIVING5
=1 if respondent has lived in his/her community for 0.649 0.477 0 1
more than ve years, 0 otherwise.
Continued on Next Page. . .
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Table 1 Summary Statistics and Variable Denitions Continued
Variable Denition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Regional Controls. Omitted Category: Pacic
NEWENGL =1 if census region is New England, 0 otherwise. 0.043 0.204 0 1
MIDATLAN =1 if census region is Mid Atlantic, 0 otherwise. 0.086 0.282 0 1
EANOCENT =1 if census region is East North Central, 0 otherwise. 0.220 0.414 0 1
WENOCENT =1 if census region is West North Central, 0 otherwise. 0.067 0.250 0 1
SOUTHATL =1 if census region is South Atlantic, 0 otherwise. 0.213 0.410 0 1
EASOCENT =1 if census region is East South Central, 0 otherwise. 0.041 0.198 0 1
WESOCENT =1 if census region is West South Central, 0 otherwise. 0.053 0.223 0 1
MOUNTAIN =1 if census region is Mountain, 0 otherwise. 0.069 0.254 0 1
Urban Area Controls
MURDER Number of murders per 100,000 people. 6.123 4.017 0 20.4
DISSIMILARITY
Dissimilarity index for segregation of 0.566 0.141 0.2 0.8
blacks versus non-blacks.
Results
In each of the social interaction measures examined, I estimate two di¤erent
specications. The base model is a bare-bones approach that only utilizes the in-
struments in the rst stage and then tests the relationship between social interac-
tion and tract density with no other controls included. The full model incorporates
the control variables, Xi, in the rst-stage and second-stage. In both models, I use
clustered standard errors at the MSA.
First Stage Results
Table 2 shows the rst stage results for the geological instruments. For each of
the instruments, the rst stage results largely yield the expected relationship with
tract density and are highly signicant. The landslide hazard instrument yields the
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expected negative relationship in the base model, but in the full model, the rela-
tionship is not signicantly di¤erent from zero. The seismic hazard instruments,
comprised of the rate, dummy, and interaction variables mostly follow intuition. In
the base model, the relationship between tract population density and the rate of
seismic hazard is positive, while controlling for a signicantly positive west-coast
e¤ect with the dummy for high hazard values. The interaction term is negative sig-
nifying that as the hazard increases in a high hazard environment, tract population
density declines. In the full model, the results are more precise. The hazard rate
is now signicantly positively related to density, and the interaction coe¢ cient is
signicantly negative. The relationship of sedimentary rock with density is intu-
itive and consistent across both specications with a positive and signicant coe¢ -
cient.
I use a number of tests to estimate the strength of the instruments. In every
specication, the rst stage F-statistic is well above 10, the rule-of-thumb for in-
strument relevance in the rst stage. The minimum F-statistic is 19.13 for the
clustered-base model with a maximum of 742.37 for the base model. The rst
stage is not underidentied or weakly identied as it passes all tests. The Anderson-
Rubin test shows the instruments strongly predict local population density.
Friends and Neighbors Results
Table 3 presents the relationship between census tract population density and
social interactions involving friends and neighbors in the base model specication.
The majority of the estimates indicate the coe¢ cient on tract density is positive,
as expected. This provides some support for the assumption that as population
density increases so does social interaction. The number of people in which an
individual condes, the number of friends, and socializing with friends in public
places are all signicantly positively related to tract density. To give an example
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Table 2: Density and Geological Instruments: First Stage Results
Specication Base Model Full Model
Dependent Variable:
Coe¤. Coe¤.
Tract Population Density
Landslide Hazard -0.047 0.008
(0.139) (0.075)
Seismic Hazard 0.002 0.070***
(0.030) (0.025)
High Seismic Hazard 1.059*** 2.086***
(0.389) (0.599)
Seismic Hazard Interaction -0.001 -0.068***
(0.030) (0.025)
% Sedimentary Rock 0.658*** 0.361
(0.163) (0.267)
Constant 7.363*** 7.122***
(0.315) (0.510)
N 22052 21405
Number of Clusters 311 311
Partial R-squared 0.1441 0.0526
Instrument Tests
F-Statistic 19.13 48.26
Kleibergen-Paap rk
72.17 21.90
underidentication
p-value 0.0000 0.0005
Kleibergen-Paap rk
14.38 4.36
weak indentication
p-value - -
Anderson-Rubin
4.81 2.52
weak instrument
p-value 0.0003 0.0297
Notes: The Full Model includes various other control variables, such as age,
race, income, education, marital status, etc. The full list of other controls can
be seen in other tables, for example, Table 4. *,**,*** denotes statistical
signicance at the .10, .05, and .01 level. (Standard errors)
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on the size of this e¤ect, an increase in local population density by 10 percent in-
creases the amount of socializing with friends in public from around once a month
to just under three times a month at the average. Talking with neighbors and the
number of neighbors an individual knows, however, are both shown to signicantly
decrease with density. This tells and interesting story. If the individual resides
in a lower density area, the suburbs for example, he seems to interact more with
his neighbors. When the individual, however, locates in a dense urban setting, he
interacts less with neighbors. This may be a¤ected by the use of the words "im-
mediate neighbor" when the survey was conducted. The person located down the
hall or in the next building across the street may not constitute as an "immediate
neighbor" in a dense urban setting.
In the full model, most of the signicance is lost. In Table 4, the neighbor inter-
actions still yield negative but not signicantly negative results. The conde inter-
action is the only signicant positive relationship remaining. Density is negatively
related to both the number of friends and how often individuals socialize at home
but not signicantly di¤erent from zero. Last, hanging out with friends in public
places is positively related to local density.
The problem with including more control variables is that the variables them-
selves are not exogenously determined in reality. Density choice may depend upon
income, marital status or other controls, and if the inclusion of those covariates
is also correlated with social interaction, it creates a bad control problem bias or
proxy control bias (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). The inclusion of these controls
may increase the likelihood of causal interpretation by removing some omitted vari-
able bias, but since they could also be considered outcomes that depend upon social
interaction and/or population density, they may confound the result of interest. If,
however, the instruments are e¤ective, the omitted variable bias and endogeneity
is purged in the base and clustered-base model, leaving a consistent coe¢ cient of
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interest.
The friends results capture the majority of the positive relationships which cor-
responds with the assumption made in the theoretical model. The neighbor inter-
actions, however, are consistently found to have a negative or signicantly negative
relationship with density. These results may indicate suburbs provide a better en-
vironment for neighbors to interact, and are counter-intuitive to the models predic-
tion.
The OLS results in the base and clustered-base model show the importance of
the instruments. In all cases the magnitudes of the estimated coe¢ cients is pulled
to zero for the OLS results. In two of the six estimations, the OLS results di¤ered
in sign, and overall the results are more precise with the instrumental variables
technique.
The friends and neighbors results tables also report the instrument tests. The
rst stage F-statistic, as discussed earlier, is high in all specications. Other tests
including the KleibergenPaap test statistics are also large signifying underidenti-
cation and weak instruments is not a concern. The Stock and Yogo (2005) criti-
cal values for weak instrument tests are used since no critical values are available
in the literature when clustering is applied. In almost all cases, I fail to reject the
overidentifying restrictions, as the Hansen-J statistics are close to zero. This pro-
vides evidence that the geological instruments are exogenously determined and suf-
ciently strong.
Group Involvement Results
Table 5 reports the results for group involvement interaction and population
density in the base model. The results for social interaction involving groups, clubs
or a neighborhood cooperation yield a negative relationship with local population
density. The number of club meetings respondents attend is the only statistically
30
Table 4: Tract Density and Friendship-Oriented Social Interaction: Full Model
Specication Full Model
Dependent Variable #NEITALK NEITALK CONFIDE FRIENDS SOCPUBLIC SOCHOME
Technique (2SLS) (IVPROBIT) (2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS)
Coe¤. Coe¤. Coe¤. Coe¤. Coe¤. Coe¤.
TRACT DENSITY -0.054 -0.035 0.035** -0.003 0.377 -0.780
(0.052) (0.043) (0.015) (0.015) (0.530) (0.521)
MALE 0.079*** 0.039* -0.106*** 0.063*** -1.983*** 0.136
AGE 0.022*** 0.007* -0.008*** -0.021*** -1.325*** -1.193***
AGE2 -0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000*** 0.009*** 0.008***
MARRD/PARTN 0.165*** 0.092*** 0.022* -0.009 -4.655*** -1.707***
KIDS6 0.129*** 0.091*** -0.048*** -0.062*** -1.528*** -0.885***
KIDS6_17 0.057*** 0.044*** -0.031*** -0.047*** -0.891*** -0.437**
INC2 -0.022 -0.059* 0.063*** 0.010 0.513 0.266
INC3 0.081** -0.027 0.116*** 0.079*** 1.833*** 0.893**
INC4 0.115*** -0.033 0.156*** 0.110*** 2.547*** 1.777***
INC5 0.126*** -0.012 0.155*** 0.105*** 3.232*** 1.313**
INC6 0.169*** 0.007 0.201*** 0.248*** 4.599*** 3.841***
SOMECOLL 0.185*** 0.094*** 0.154*** 0.153*** 1.994*** 2.179***
COLLGRAD 0.172*** 0.034 0.236*** 0.267*** 1.386*** 0.737**
BLACK -0.418*** -0.140*** -0.218*** -0.429*** -2.652*** -3.085***
HISPANIC -0.481*** -0.172*** -0.309*** -0.224*** -2.210*** -4.597***
ASIAN -0.350*** -0.180*** -0.166*** -0.176*** -3.184*** -3.474***
UNEMP -0.060 -0.014 -0.122*** -0.119*** 0.549 0.065
HOMEMAKER 0.127** 0.091** 0.025 0.024 1.351** 0.682
RETIRED 0.207*** 0.136*** 0.060*** 0.169*** 1.603*** 2.129***
CITIZEN 0.509*** 0.303*** 0.161*** 0.032 1.125 3.856***
LIVING5 0.266*** 0.112*** 0.026** 0.110*** 1.500*** 1.973***
PACIFIC 0.193** 0.085 -0.000 0.151*** 1.627*** 1.230*
MIDATLAN 0.070 0.065 -0.046 0.002 0.103 -0.641
EANOCENT 0.140* 0.051 0.002 0.113*** 1.229 -0.345
WENOCENT 0.332*** 0.190*** 0.010 0.131*** 2.219*** 0.408
SOUTHATL 0.134 0.046 -0.035 0.081*** 0.211 -1.214
EASOCENT 0.110 0.033 -0.045 0.134** 1.071 -1.752
WESOCENT 0.240** 0.029 -0.034 0.115*** 1.116 -0.456
MOUNTAIN 0.319*** 0.105 0.017 0.174*** 2.998*** 2.498***
MURDER -0.006 0.001 -0.003 -0.005** -0.126*** -0.046
DISSIMILARITY 0.412* 0.181 -0.076 0.168 4.179* 1.570
CONSTANT 3.418*** -0.599 3.271*** 3.378*** 49.018*** 56.595***
OLS or Probit Result
TRACT DENSITY 0.016 0.006 0.000 -0.009 0.332*** -0.022
N 21405 21539 21483 21486 21487 21466
Number of Clusters 307 308 308 307 308 308
Uncentered R-squared 0.892 - 0.957 0.914 0.508 0.563
Centered R-squared 0.074 - 0.077 0.075 0.156 0.091
Instrument Tests
First Stage F-Statistic 47.20 - 48.24 49.86 48.78 48.64
Kleibergen-Paap rk
3.28 - 3.37 3.33 3.40 3.34
underidentication
p-value 0.6567 - 0.6426 0.6496 0.6387 0.6473
Kleibergen-Paap rk
4.36 - 4.33 4.41 4.38 4.38
weak indentication
Stock-Yogo (10%) 10.83 - 10.83 10.83 10.83 10.83
Hanson-J over indent.
4.15 - 4.13 1.20 7.70 5.18
test statistic
p-value 0.3858 - 0.3892 0.8778 0.1032 0.2690
Notes: The instrument tests are not valid for the IV probit specication. *,**,*** denotes statistical signicance at
the .10, .05, .01 level. (Standard errors)
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signicant relationship. This is not the expected result. Perhaps, the cost of gath-
ering for these meetings or establishing these groups increases with higher density.
Nonetheless, the hobby club interaction measure is positively but not signicantly
correlated with density.
The full model results for group involvement interaction are shown in Table 6.
The estimation yields association with a hobby club, attending club meetings, and
the number of groups all decrease with increased population density. The e¤ect
is signicantly di¤erent from zero for club meetings and number of groups. The
remaining estimate is a positive relationship between neighborhood cooperation and
density.
The friends and neighbors and group involvement results yield a di¤ering view
of the relationship between social interaction and local population density; this is
in contrast to recent ndings in the literature on the relationship. Brueckner and
Largey (2008) examine the same set of social interaction measures (the ten inter-
action measures from above) using an instrumental framework as discussed earlier.
Nine of the ten estimated coe¢ cients reported are negative, seven of which are sta-
tistically signicant. Their results imply that as density in an area increases the
social interaction of the inhabitantsdeclines. These results are contrary to their
hypothesis. The last estimate is positive but insignicant. These results, however,
may be driven by inadequate instruments.
The literature has not discussed, however, the importance of the measurement
or type of social interaction in the realization of the relationship with density. The
friends results link social interaction and density positively, while the neighbors and
group involvement interaction is shown to decrease with higher density. These so-
cial interaction measures are narrowly dened and this could be a drawback of ana-
lyzing ten di¤erent specications.
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Table 5: Tract Density and Group-Involvement Social Interaction: Base Model
Specication Base Model
Dependent Variable NEICOOP HOBBYCLUB CLUBMTGS #GROUPS
Technique (IVPROBIT) (IVPROBIT) (2SLS) (2SLS)
Coe¤. Coe¤. Coe¤. Coe¤.
TRACT DENSITY -0.016 0.003 -0.316* -0.001
(0.034) (0.028) (0.165) (0.075)
CONSTANT -0.346 -0.656*** 8.732*** 3.050***
(0.271) (0.225) (1.330) (0.589)
OLS or Probit Result
TRACT DENSITY -0.002 -0.020** -0.144* -0.002
N 10843 22020 22005 22052
Number of Clusters 257 311 311 311
Uncentered R-squared - - 0.206 0.574
Centered R-squared - - 0.000 0.000
Instrument Tests
First Stage F-Statistic - - 19.21 19.13
Kleibergen-Paap rk
- - 11.73 11.74
underidentication
p-value - - 0.0386 0.0385
Kleibergen-Paap rk
- - 14.43 14.42
weak indentication
Stock-Yogo (10%) - - 10.83 10.83
Hanson-J over ident.
- - 1.31 5.33
test statistic
p-value - - 0.8601 0.2548
Notes: The instrument tests are not valid for the IV probit specication. *,**,*** denotes statistical signicance at
the .10, .05, .01 level. (Standard errors)
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Table 6: Tract Density and Group-Involvement Social Interaction: Full Model
Specication Full Model
Dependent Variable NEICOOP HOBBYCLUB CLUBMTGS #GROUPS
Technique (IVPROBIT) (IVPROBIT) (2SLS) (2SLS)
Coe¤. Coe¤. Coe¤. Coe¤.
TRACT DENSITY 0.036 -0.055** -1.020*** -0.187**
(0.056) (0.025) (0.257) (0.086)
MALE 0.061** 0.153*** -0.655*** 0.077*
AGE 0.026*** 0.008** -0.258*** 0.025***
AGE2 -0.000*** -0.000** 0.002*** -0.000*
MARRD/PARTN 0.078*** -0.062*** -0.931*** -0.029
KIDS6 0.028 -0.060*** -0.476*** -0.029
KIDS6_17 0.055*** -0.027** 0.448*** 0.274***
INC2 -0.061* -0.081** -0.360 0.053
INC3 -0.008 0.063** 0.377** 0.307***
INC4 0.046 0.109*** 0.716*** 0.454***
INC5 0.116*** 0.163*** 0.414 0.604***
INC6 0.215*** 0.233*** 1.579*** 0.993***
SOMECOLL 0.236*** 0.319*** 2.342*** 0.948***
COLLGRAD 0.263*** 0.450*** 4.197*** 1.789***
BLACK 0.125** -0.021 -0.110 0.660***
HISPANIC -0.011 -0.046 -0.590* 0.080
ASIAN -0.213** -0.055 -1.700*** -0.263**
UNEMP -0.205** -0.123** -0.311 -0.418***
HOMEMAKER 0.067 0.021 0.511 -0.315***
RETIRED -0.069 0.126*** 0.588* -0.093
CITIZEN 0.247*** 0.175*** 1.714*** 0.605***
LIVING5 0.217*** 0.082*** 1.001*** 0.385***
PACIFIC -0.015 0.063 0.762* 0.314***
MIDATLAN -0.244*** -0.056 -0.673 -0.187
EANOCENT -0.106 -0.012 -0.461 -0.019
WENOCENT 0.161*** 0.057 0.801** 0.260***
SOUTHATL 0.061 0.014 -0.554 0.045
EASOCENT -0.036 -0.056 -1.301** -0.047
WESOCENT -0.038 -0.044 -0.078 -0.084
MOUNTAIN 0.131** 0.110*** 1.341** 0.390***
MURDER -0.013*** -0.008*** 0.014 -0.011
DISSIMILARITY 0.454** 0.435*** 2.514** 1.290***
CONSTANT -2.300*** -1.153*** 14.788*** 0.647
OLS or Probit Result
TRACT DENSITY 0.011 -0.014* -0.074 0.026*
N 10592 21514 21513 21539
Number of Clusters 255 308 308 308
Uncentered R-squared - - 0.228 0.636
Centered R-squared - - 0.027 0.143
Instrument Tests
First Stage F-Statistic - - 47.89 48.26
Kleibergen-Paap rk
- - 3.36 3.37
underidentication
p-value - - 0.6444 0.6434
Kleibergen-Paap rk
- - 4.37 4.37
weak indentication
Stock-Yogo (10%) - - 10.83 10.83
Hanson-J over ident.
- - 3.61 3.24
test statistic
p-value - - 0.4621 0.5186
Notes: The instrument tests are not valid for the IV probit specication. *,**,*** denotes
statistical signicance at the .10, .05, .01 level. (Standard errors)
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Table 8: Tract Density and Index Measures of Social Interaction: Full Model
Specication Full Model
Dependent Variable FACTOR FACTOR2 SOCTRUST FAITHBAS CIVICPART DIVERSITY
Technique (2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS) (2SLS)
Coe¤. Coe¤. Coe¤. Coe¤. Coe¤. Coe¤.
TRACT DENSITY -0.017 -0.024 0.008 -0.098** -0.023 0.035
(0.025) (0.028) (0.013) (0.044) (0.053) (0.057)
MALE 0.015 0.035*** -0.054*** -0.126*** -0.073*** -0.096***
AGE 0.008** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.002 0.036*** 0.056***
AGE2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** 0.000* -0.000*** -0.001***
MARRD/PARTN 0.079*** 0.082*** 0.062*** 0.059*** 0.007 0.181***
KIDS6 0.054*** 0.067*** -0.030*** 0.043*** -0.027* -0.062**
KIDS6_17 0.026** 0.033*** -0.001 0.079*** 0.053*** 0.012
INC2 -0.013 -0.024 0.022 -0.006 0.028 0.072
INC3 0.009 0.013 0.085*** 0.020 0.123*** 0.391***
INC4 0.036 0.018 0.130*** 0.029 0.219*** 0.480***
INC5 0.019 0.027 0.131*** 0.032 0.247*** 0.556***
INC6 0.061* 0.044* 0.162*** 0.023 0.329*** 0.824***
SOMECOLL 0.071*** 0.074*** 0.147*** 0.168*** 0.519*** 0.938***
COLLGRAD 0.027 0.044** 0.307*** 0.234*** 0.910*** 1.117***
BLACK -0.158*** -0.159*** -0.497*** 0.295*** 0.061 -0.174***
HISPANIC -0.122*** -0.185*** -0.400*** 0.158*** -0.140*** -0.213**
ASIAN -0.210*** -0.152*** -0.146*** 0.039 -0.569*** -1.082***
UNEMP -0.051 -0.030 -0.134*** -0.063* -0.154*** -0.371***
HOMEMAKER 0.096** 0.065** 0.076*** 0.118*** -0.085*** -0.528***
RETIRED 0.095*** 0.102*** 0.048** 0.067** -0.034 -0.255***
CITIZEN 0.256*** 0.236*** 0.115*** 0.075*** 0.871*** 1.302***
LIVING5 0.103*** 0.108*** 0.011 0.112*** 0.171*** 0.207***
PACIFIC 0.145** 0.080 0.056* -0.011 0.114 0.352***
MIDATLAN 0.064 0.047 0.093** 0.012 -0.246*** -0.153
EANOCENT 0.105** 0.059 0.130*** 0.044 -0.168* -0.135
WENOCENT 0.227*** 0.153*** 0.120*** 0.091** 0.032 0.136
SOUTHATL 0.138** 0.056 0.066* 0.096 -0.178** -0.057
EASOCENT 0.111 0.043 0.129*** 0.151 -0.188 -0.267
WESOCENT 0.146** 0.082 0.079* 0.161** -0.286*** -0.053
MOUNTAIN 0.159*** 0.117** 0.057* -0.029 0.178* 0.360***
MURDER -0.006* -0.001 -0.009*** 0.004 -0.010* -0.018**
DISSIMILARITY 0.303** 0.164 -0.187*** 0.278* 0.606* 0.166
CONSTANT -0.841*** -0.721*** -0.689*** -0.129 -0.674 2.785***
OLS or Probit Result
TRACT DENSITY -0.002 0.003 -0.035*** -0.028*** 0.035*** 0.050***
N 10430 21199 21449 21373 21538 21534
Number of Clusters 252 305 308 308 308 308
Uncentered R-squared 0.059 0.062 0.982 0.982 0.982 0.982
Centered R-squared 0.059 0.062 0.328 0.329 0.328 0.328
Instrument Tests
First Stage F-Statistic 41.27 50.34 49.35 45.85 48.21 48.43
Kleibergen-Paap rk
2.87 3.27 3.37 3.34 3.37 3.37
underidentication
p-value 0.7160 0.6586 0.6436 0.6477 0.6433 0.6428
Kleibergen-Paap rk
2.85 4.39 4.33 4.41 4.37 4.37
weak identication
Stock-Yogo (10%) 10.83 10.83 10.83 10.83 10.83 10.83
Hanson-J over ident.
4.99 3.93 2.61 9.80 4.39 2.07
test statistic
p-value 2.8850 0.4151 0.6248 0.0440 0.3557 0.7237
Notes: *,**,*** denotes statistical signicance at the .10, .05, .01 level. (Standard errors)
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Index Results
Several index measures are used in the same manner as the social interaction
dependent variables. All of the indexes produce a lower dimensional aspect of the
social interaction data to combat one potential aw in looking at each specic type
of social interaction separately. This method reduces the number of variables of
interest while keeping the existing variability, allowing for a more general den-
ition of social interaction to be tested. The drawback for some of the indexes
SOCTRUST, FAITHBAS, CIVICPART and DIVERSITYis they are not created
from the exact 10 social interaction variables used in the rest of the study and may
not exactly portray social interaction as dened here. A limitation of the other
indexes, FACTOR and FACTOR2, is the assumptions that all forms of social inter-
action are linearly related, and that large variance implies large importance. These
index measures contain several di¤erent types interaction which individually may
respond di¤erently to changes in density. The theoretical model, however, does not
specify di¤erent types of social interaction, but states interaction is positively cor-
related with local density. The indexes are used in a similar way to the ten above
estimates in the empirical model explained above.
Table 7 shows the relationship between census tract density and the social inter-
action indexes for the base model. The results, in general, indicate the type of so-
cial interaction matters. The FACTOR and FACTOR2 specications consistently
yield a signicant negative relationship. Social interaction, when measured more
generally, falls with an increase in population density. The results for the indexes
from the SCCBS, however, are mostly positive. Social trust, civic participation,
and diversity of friendship all have a signicantly positive relationship with density.
The FAITHBAS interaction index yields the remaining negative relationship. The
OLS results are in line with the instrumental patterns in terms of sign, but are not
as large in magnitude.
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In the full model, shown in Table 8, the relationships lose magnitude and signif-
icance. The only signicant result remaining in both specications is a negative
relationship between tract density and faith-based interactions. This consistent
result indicates church attendance and belonging to faith-based organizations are
signicantly reduced with increasing local population density. As discussed above,
each specication includes a series of tests for instrument strength. The tests are
largely passed indicating strong instruments. The results in Tables 7 and 8 are new
to the literature and supplement the earlier results.
Conclusions
This paper examines the relationship between urban sprawl and social interac-
tion, as the result of a density externality. A theoretical model proposes individu-
als will not fully take into account their neighborssocial interaction when choosing
lot size. This leads to a density externality and when replicated throughout the
city, urban sprawl is found. The theoretical ndings hinge on the assumption that
social interaction and local population density are positively related. An instru-
mental variables approach is used to empirically estimate this relationship. The
empirical evidence shows that the type of social interaction matter when determin-
ing the relationship with density. Social interaction involving friends tends to be
positively related with local population density which supports urban sprawl as a
result of a density externality. Social interaction with neighbors or groups largely
decreases as population density increases suggesting urban sprawl is not caused by
social interaction. New to the literature, index measures are used to more gener-
ally dene social interaction. The empirical results yield a negative relationship
between the index measures and population density.
This papers results are important for several reasons. The relationship between
social interaction and local population density is consistently estimated using ex-
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ogenously determined instruments. This addresses concerns of endogeneity present
in the literature. Further when measured using indexes, the relationship between
social interaction and local population density suggests that urban sprawl is not
caused by a density externality. This result of this paper supports the previous lit-
eratures ndings. When social interaction is measured less generally, the type of
social interaction is important in determining its relationship with local population
density. This suggests the theory determining social interactions e¤ect on cities
expansion should be re-examined taking into account the di¤erent types of social
interaction and how they may alter lot size choice. This might be taken one step
further to allow location choice as an endogenously determined outcome within the
model. This method would give insight into how social interaction, location and
lot size choice interact when simultaneously optimized.
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3 SOCIAL INTERACTION AND URBAN LOCATION DECISIONS
Introduction
Social interaction is a critical component of cities. The simple act of exchanging
information and ideas between individuals is central to understanding why cities ex-
ist. In fact, the revival in the growth of cities over the last few decades is partially
due to the improvement in social interaction of their inhabitants.17 Social interac-
tion is a unique aspect of cities that is fundamental for urban economic research.
The e¤ect of social interaction on location choice, however, is somewhat overlooked
to this point in the literature.
This paper develops a new theoretical model to investigate the e¤ect of social in-
teraction on the individuals intra-urban location and housing choice. This is the
rst of such models to include social interaction directly into the simultaneous deci-
sions of housing and location within a city.18 I also preform empirical tests of the
theoretical models predictions.
I extend the standard Alonso-Muth urban consumer choice model to directly
include a measure of social interaction into the individuals utility function. The
derivation of the theoretical results is preformed in two stages. First, social inter-
action is assumed to be exogenously determined city wide; then, social interaction
is endogenously determined by othersactions and allowed to vary across location.
In both stages, the model yields empirically testable results which I examine using
survey data on social interaction from the Social Capital Community Benchmark
Survey along with census tract data for several U.S. urban areas.
17Glaeser and Gottlieb (2006) discuss how the reduction in crime and increased demand for
interaction fueled a resurgence in urban growth.
18Recent theoretical work by Helsely and Zenou (2011) describes the e¤ects of social networks
and their central players on the location choice of the players involved. Additionally, Zenou
(2011) presents a theoretical framework using social interaction to explain negative labor market
outcomes based on the location, or distance from job, of the individual.
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The exogenous social interaction model nds that location and the demand for
housing are signicantly altered depending on the degree of substitutability be-
tween social interaction and housing. The endogenous social interaction models
results depend upon the relationship between density and social interaction; the
ndings suggest either a reinforcing or o¤setting e¤ect to the exogenous models
prediction. The empirical test analyzes the e¤ect of individualsappetites for dif-
fering types of social interaction on the observed density across location. The em-
pirical results o¤er strong support for the models predictions.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a literature
review. Section 3 provides a synopsis of the Alonso-Muth model and a full expla-
nation of how I incorporate social interaction into the framework. Section 4 empir-
ically tests the predictions of the social interaction theoretical framework. Section
5 concludes.
Literature Review
Social capital is a concept with many denitions and applications. Economists pro-
vide a multitude of implications from social capital on economic outcomes. The
issue with social capital is the lack of clarity in denition and thus measurement.
The components of social capital are sometimes characterized as social norms, neigh-
borhood e¤ects, peer e¤ects, obligations, or networks. These pieces are all impor-
tant, yet the method of their development is, perhaps, social interaction. The ac-
tual interaction between individuals in which information, ideas, norms, and other
knowledge is exchanged may be the true mechanism for the creation of social cap-
ital. Manski (2000) and Putnam (2000) charged economists to understand more
about how social interaction a¤ects outcomes and to gather more usable data on
how individuals interact within their communities.
Social interaction is becoming steadily more popular in various topics within eco-
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nomics. The theoretical implication of social interaction is vast, for example, the
understanding of capital is re-evaluated in macroeconomic models with the argu-
ment that social interaction builds di¤erent capitalhuman or social capital (Sobel,
2002), or the basis of how social interaction comes into existence over time (Horst,
2010) and spills over across space (Cabrales et al., 2011).
The literature shows the importance of social interaction empirically as well
(Ioannides and Topa, 2010), even with the issues of econometric di¢ culties, mea-
surement and lack of uniform denition (Blume and Durlauf, 2008). Social inter-
action a¤ects many measurable economic outcomes: educational outcomes in the
classroom and within the academic community through coauthorship (Giorgi and
Pellizzari, 2011), health outcomes such as smoking (Fletcher, 2010), the prevalence
of tax evasion (Fortin et al., 2004), and geographical mobility (David et al., 2010).
Social interaction has even been brought into the experimental lab; the lab pro-
vides a better environment (no confounders) to measure social interaction (Hirano
and Hahn, 2010). Falk and Fischbacher (2002) test how social interaction a¤ects
"crime" in the lab with the presence of social interaction and social pressure. La-
bor markets are also inuenced by social interaction. The formation of human cap-
ital and the agglomeration of such capital is shown to increase wages (Rosenthal
and Strange, 2008). Also, the way information is disseminated across individu-
als, through strong versus weak social ties, a¤ects the persistence of unemployment
(Zenou, 2011).
Social interactions importance for cities is apparent immediately, cities are a
direct result of individuals coming together in space. Gaspar and Glaeser (1998)
discuss the future existence of cities with the advances of technology removing the
need to come together in space to conduct social interaction. Social interaction af-
fects the characteristics in terms of social and consumer amenities of cities (Glaeser
and Gottlieb, 2006). The relationship between the growth of cities and social in-
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teraction is important for issues such as urban sprawl and urban redevelopment
(Brueckner and Largey, 2008).
The research on theoretical implications of social interaction on urban economic
outcomes is in infancy. The main application of social interaction into urban the-
oretical models is to allow for a central interaction location. All social interaction
occurs at one point in space and there is a transportation cost to travel to the loca-
tion. These costs lead to lower than optimal visits to the interaction hub and lower
population density across space (Helsley and Strange, 2006). Helsley and Zenou
(2011) examine the location decisions of individuals tied to social networks where
again all interaction occurs at an interaction center. The model predicts individu-
als who are central players in the social network to reside closer to the interaction
center compared to peripheral players in the social network.
This paper builds on to the urban economic modeling of social interaction in
important ways. First, the individual consumes interaction at any point in space
within the urban area. This removes the need for interaction to take place in one
central location. Second, the model allows for the consumption of housing and the
decision of location to be made simultaneous with social interaction choice. This
is an advancement since location choice is not solely based on interaction value.
Third, the exibility of the model allows for the type of social interaction to mat-
ter when making location and housing consumption choices. Further, the paper
provides empirical support for the predictions of the social interaction model, which
is also new to the literature.
A New Theoretical Approach to Social Interactions and Ur-
ban Location Choices
This section presents a formal link of social interaction and urban location the-
ory. I begin by introducing the basic Alonso-Muth framework, one of the canon-
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ical models in urban economics.19 This theoretical model discusses an individ-
ual agent in a spatial world who consumes both housing and non-housing goods
while simultaneously determining optimal location within a given urban area. The
Alonso-Muth model leads to spatial equilibrium a central concept for urban eco-
nomics. Spatial equilibrium states individuals gain no utility from relocating. Put
another way, there is no other location that would make the individual happier. It
is understood, given the prevalence of migrants within and across cities, that spatial
equilibrium is not achieved; yet, the notion of equilibrium provides urban economics
a theoretical platform to analyze how fundamental economic factors within cities
determine spatial prices and land use patterns.
After presenting the canonical model, I include social interaction into the urban
consumer model and examine the changes to basic urban decision making. The re-
sults of interest are the location and consumption decisions, and how those choices
are inuenced by the introduction of social interaction. This is a novel idea, yet,
tractable. The framework yields empirically testable hypotheses regarding observ-
able relationships between social interaction and land use patterns. Social interac-
tion is allowed to take multiple forms in the model and, depending on the assump-
tions made about each form, the spatial equilibrium is altered in distinct ways.
Alonzo-Muth Model
Consider an urban area on a featureless plane. Residents travel to the central
business district (CBD), a point in space where all employment takes place. The
agent in this model is the utility maximizing individual, who is constrained by a
budget. The individual makes choices about the level of housing and non-housing
consumption, as well as, a residence location inside the urban area. The individ-
19The Alonso-Muth model of urban consumer theory is the rst to allow for the simultaneous
decision of location and consumption decisions in an urban context. See Alonso (1964), Mills
(1967) and Muth (1969).
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ual regularly travels along ubiquitous routes to the CBD and incurs transportation
costs, T , which is increasing in distance at a non-increasing rate, and increasing at
a positive, but less than identity, rate with an increase in income.20 The individ-
uals choices are represented as
max
x;y;k
U(x; y) s:t: I = P (k)x+ y + T (k; I) (12)
where x = housing consumption, y = non-housing consumption, k = distance from
CBD, I = gross income, P (k) = housing price function, U(x; y) is a well-behaved
utility function and T (k; I) is a transportation cost function. The housing price
function, P (k), is allowed to vary across location within the urban landscape. The
housing price function is not specied, however, its characteristics are deduced after
equilibrium is achieved.
This model, while certainly solvable, is quite cumbersome since location is so in-
tertwined with housing price and transportation costs. This problem is made more
tractable by Muths innovation to assign an arbitrary distance and exclude distance
as a choice variable. Once this is done, the individual can make the consumption
decisions optimally conditional on the arbitrary location. Lastly the individual
chooses the location that yields the greatest conditional utility.21
Conditional on a given location, k, the individuals optimal consumption bundle
is the solution to
max
x;y
U(x; y) s:t: I = P (k)x+ y + T (k; I) (13)
20In other words, it is assumed Tk > 0; Tkk  0; 0 < TI < 1: The last assumption may seem
counter-intuitive: as income rises the individual can a¤ord a faster mode of transportation. The
notion of transportation costs used here, however, includes opportunity costs. In other words, the
individuals time cost of traveling increases as income rises.
21Turnbull (1995) expands on how this simplication eases the problem and provides great
insight to how both approaches are equivalent.
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where k is now suppressed as a choice variable. The rst order conditions for this
constrained maximization problem are:
Ux   P (k) = 0 (14)
Uy    = 0 (15)
I   T (k; I)  P (k)x  y = 0: (16)
From these conditions, the implicit Marshallian demand functions for housing and
non-housing consumption, at a given location k; are dened as
[x(P; Io); y(P; Io)] = argmax[U(x; y) s:t: Io = Px+ y]; (17)
where P = P (k) and Io = I T (k; I) is income net of transportation costs. The de-
mand functions above state, at any given k; the choices of housing and non-housing
consumption are determined by the bundle [x(P; Io); y(P; Io)]. These demand
functions help derive some useful relationships that are employed later to nd the
spatial equilibrium. The rst relationship places the demand functions back into
the budget constraint and di¤erentiates the budget constraint with respect to price,
 x(P; Io) = P (k)( @x
@P
) +
@y
@P
: (18)
The second relationship is found by di¤erentiating the budget constraint with re-
spect to net income to get22
1 = P (k)(
@x
@Io
) +
@y
@Io
: (19)
These relationships are important to nding the key spatial equilibrium condition.
22Remember, the demand functions in equation (17) are substituted back into the budget con-
straint.
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With the optimal choices of housing and non-housing consumption dened at
any given location k, the individual chooses an optimal distance or location that
yields the highest utility from consumption. In other words, the indirect utility
function, found using the demand bundles, (17), is maximized by choosing location.
Indirect utility, V , is dened as
V [P (k); I   T (k; I)] = U [x(P; Io); y(P; Io)]: (20)
The indirect utility function describes the ideal consumption bundle at any loca-
tion, and by doing so, the only endogenous determinate is distance. The individ-
uals choice is
max
k
V [P (k); I   T (k; I)]: (21)
Di¤erentiate the indirect utility function with respect to k and set equal to zero to
nd the optimal distance,
Vk = VpPk   VITk = 0: (22)
This rst order condition is simplied by substituting in for Vp and VI which uti-
lizes equation (20).
Vp = Ux
@x
@P
+ Uy
@y
@P
(23)
VI = Ux
@x
@Io
+ Uy
@y
@Io
(24)
The next step substitutes in for Ux and Uy with information from the rst order
conditions in equations (14) and (15).
Vp = P (k)
@x
@P
+ 
@y
@P
(25)
VI = P (k)
@x
@Io
+ 
@y
@Io
(26)
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After gathering a  in both equations it becomes clear how equations (18) and (19)
are useful. Using those two conditions, Vp and VI are simplied further
Vp = [P (k)
@x
@P
+
@y
@P
] =  x(P; Io); (27)
VI = [P (k)
@x
@Io
+
@y
@Io
] = : (28)
Now the information supplied in equation (22) reduces to
 x(P; Io)Pk   Tk = 0
Since it is known that  > 0;23 the last simplication is to divide both sides by the
multiplier, .
 Pkx(P; Io)  Tk = 0: (29)
Thus, the optimal choice of distance, k, is the solution to what is known in the
urban literature as Muths equation.
The spatial equilibrium outcome is driven by Muths equation. This equation
sets equal the marginal cost of distance (MCD), Tk or the additional transporta-
tion cost incurred by moving further out, with the marginal benet of distance
(MBD),  Pkx(P; I) or the savings in housing price by moving another unit of dis-
tance away, where Pk < 0 is required for the solution to hold.24 By setting the
marginal cost equal to the marginal benet, there is no incentive for the individ-
ual to relocate within the urban area; spatial equilibrium is achieved by locating at
distance k. With the optimal distance given by Muths equation, the optimal con-
sumption bundle is found by imputing the optimal distance into the housing and
23This is shown by the design of the maximization problem and can be seen in equation 15 for
example.
24This is an intuitive resultas you move further away from the center of the city the per unit
cost of housing is reduced.
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non-housing demand functions;
x = x(P (k); I   T (k; I)) and y = y(P (k); I   T (k; I)): (30)
The optimal housing consumption at k and Muths equation are the central rela-
tionships for this study.
The housing price function, P (k), can now be fully characterized. Muths equa-
tion requires housing prices to fall with distance, Pk < 0. Additionally, the hous-
ing price function is a strictly convex function of distance. Given the problem is a
maximization, the second order condition, or the total derivation of Muths equa-
tion in implicit form with respect to k, must be negative, or
Vkk

=  Pkkx(P; Io)  Tkk   Pk[ @x
@P
Pk   @x
@Io
Tk] < 0: (31)
This requires that Pkk > 0 since it is known the second and third term are posi-
tive.25
The housing demand gradient with respect to distance is the last piece of the
puzzle. In order to derive the housing gradient, I di¤erentiate the Marshallian de-
mand for housing by distance;
@x
@k
=
@x
@P
Pk   @x
@Io
Tk
= Pk[
@x
@P
+ x(P; Io)
@x
@Io
]
= Pk(
@xh
@P
) > 0; (32)
where Muths relationship Tk =  Pkx(P; Io) is used and @xh=@P is the com-
pensated own price e¤ect of housing. Therefore, the housing demand gradient is
25Muths equation is Vk= = 0 at k. The second order condition is Vkk < 0 for a maximum,
so that the derivative of Vk= with respect to k is D =  (@=@k)Vk=2 + Vkk= = Vkk=, where
the second equality holds since Vk = 0 at k.
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positive; housing demand increases with distance.
As shown, the optimal consumption bundle and location are all determined within
the model for the individual. Following Turnbull (1995), this model is best seen in
two graphs. Figure 4 shows two panels, top and bottom. The top is a represen-
tation of Muths equation, where the MBD must cross the MCD from above since
Muths solves a maximization problem. Remember, the intersection of these two
lines describes the optimal distance for an individual or the spatial equilibrium
outcomeadditional distance away from the CBD increases the costs more than the
benets. The bottom graph is the housing demand gradient mapped in housing
distance space. As found above in equation (32), the housing demand gradient
slopes upward. Given the optimal distance, the amount of housing demanded is
found by reading o¤ the curve showing the optimal housing consumption at that
distance, the bottom panel. Together, the two completely describe the urban con-
sumerss location and housing demands.
Introducing Social Interaction into the Alonzo-Muth Model
The social interaction model extends the canonical model to incorporate social-
izing behaviors. The model is derived in two steps. First, social interaction en-
ters as an exogenous parameter in the individuals utility function. This mimics an
amenity for a particular city. The second step is to allow social interaction to be
an endogenous choice that varies with location. The model assumes that social in-
teraction, z, provides a benet to the individual (@U=@z > 0). This additional util-
ity may work through many channels such as information transfer or simply friend-
ship. The model does not intend to explain why social interaction occurs; rather,
the intent is to examine the behavioral responses on urban decisions when social in-
teraction is taken into account. The set-up and notation of the model is identical
to the canonical model, with the addition of a social interaction parameter, z.
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Figure 4: Spatial Equilibrium and Housing Demand
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Exogenous Social Interaction The individual faces a choice of housing con-
sumption, non-housing consumption, and location. Social interaction is assumed
to be exogenously determined and constant with location. The objective function
faced by the individual is
max
x;y;k
U(x; y; z) s:t: I = P (k)x+ y + T (k; I): (33)
The choice of x; y; and k are to maximize the utility function of the individual sub-
ject to a budget constraint.
In order to make the problem more tractable, I am going to optimize rst with a
given k value, the same technique used in the Alonso-Muth model. The simplied
problem becomes
max
x;y
U(x; y; z) s:t: I = P (k)x+ y + T (k; I): (34)
I solve for the optimal choices of housing and non-housing demand given an arbi-
trary distance, k. Using the Lagrangian method, the rst order conditions are:
Ux   P (k) = 0 (35)
Uy    = 0 (36)
I   T (k; I)  P (k)x  y = 0: (37)
Just as before, these conditions guide the optimal choices of housing and non-housing
consumption that maximize the problem;
x = (P (k); I   T (k; I); z) and y =  (P (k); I   T (k; I); z): (38)
Given these demand functions, I solve for the indirect utility function, V , as fol-
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lows
V [P (k); I   T (k; I); z] = U [(P (k); I   T (k; I); z);  (P (k); I   T (k; I); z); z]: (39)
To determine what location the individual chooses, I examine the indirect utility
function directly.
max
k
V [P (k); I   T (k; I); z] (40)
Following the same steps as above, this gives the location equilibrium condition, or
Muths equation,
 Pk(P (k); I   T (k; I); z)  Tk = 0: (41)
After introducing exogenous social interaction, the solution, k, is the optimal dis-
tance where the marginal cost of distance (MCD) is equal to the marginal benet
of distance (MBD). With the optimal solution for distance, the optimal housing,
x, and non-housing, y, are found by imputing k into the demand functions in
equation (38).
The outcomes of interest for this model are the result of changes in the level of
social interaction. The canonical model can be thought of as the social interaction
model when z = 0. In this model, I am interested in nding the e¤ect of intro-
duction social interaction on location choice, k, and housing demand, x. Muths
equation is implicitly di¤erentiated with respect to social interaction, generating
the location choice comparative static,
0 =
Vkk

dk + :::+
@
@z
( Pk)dz )
dk
dz
=

Vkk
[Pk(
@
@z
)]: (42)
The sign of this relationship depends upon the sign of @=@z.26
26It is known that =Vkk < 0 and Pk < 0. Thus, sgn(dk=dz) = sgn(@=@z).
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The housing demand comparative static is slightly more complicated, but found
similarly by implicitly di¤erentiating the housing demand function, :
d
dz
=
@
@z
+ (
@
@P
Pk
@k
@z
)  ( @
@Io
Tk
@k
@z
) (43)
=
@
@z
+
@k
@z
[
@
@P
Pk   @
@Io
Tk] (44)
=
@
@z
+
@k
@z
[(
@h
@P
  x @
@Io
)Pk   @
@Io
Tk] (45)
=
@
@z
+
@k
@z
[
@h
@P
Pk +
@
@Io
( xPk   Tk)] (46)
=
@
@z
+
@k
@z
[
@h
@P
Pk]: (47)
After combining like terms, using the Slutsky equation, and using Muths equation,
the comparative static comprises two components. First, the direct e¤ect result-
ing from a change in social interaction on housing demand, @=@z. The remaining
component, @k=@z[(@h=@P )Pk], is called the location e¤ect. The location e¤ect
is derived from the e¤ect of social interaction on optimal location.27 It is known
that the sign of dk=dz follows the sign of @=@z; therefore, since it is also known
that Pk < 0 and @
h=@P < 0, the location and direct e¤ect are always reinforcing
e¤ects. In other words, the sign of the total e¤ect, d=dz, follows the sign of the
direct e¤ect, @=@z.
In order to provide intuition behind these predictions, I need to show that the
sign of the housing demand comparative static, @=@z, follows the e¤ect of a change
in social interaction on the marginal rate of substitution between housing and non-
housing.
sgn

d
dz

= sgn

dMRSxy
dz

This result states the degree of substitutability between social interaction and hous-
ing consumption determines the direction of the location and direct e¤ects found
27See Turnbull (1995) for more discussion on this terminology.
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in equation (47). In order to show this, a total di¤erential of the rst order condi-
tions, equations (35)-(37), are used to generate the fundamental equation of com-
parative statics.
266664
Uxx Uxy  P (k)
Uyx Uyy  1
 P (k)  1 0
377775
266664
dx
dy
d
377775 =
266664
 Uxz  0
 Uyz 0 0
0 x  1
377775
266664
dz
dP
dIo
377775 (48)
Using Cramers rule, the sign of the housing demand comparative static is
sgn

@
@z

= sgn
0BBBB@ 1 H

266664
 Uxz Uxy  P (k)
 Uyz Uyy  1
0  1 0
377775

1CCCCA ; (49)
where
 H is the determinate of the bordered Hessian. Since  H is known to be
positive, it follows after simplication that
sgn

@
@z

= sgn
0B@( 1)6

264 Uxz  P (k)
 Uyz  1
375

1CA (50)
= sgn(Uxz   UyzP (k)) (51)
Now that the sign of @=@z is simplied, I examine the sign of dMRSxy=dz. I
use the quotient rule and that P (k) = Ux=Uy (derived from the rst order condi-
tions) to nd the sign of dMRSxy=dz as
sgn

dMRSxy
dz

= sgn

UxzUy   UyzUx
U2y

(52)
= sgn(UxzUy   UyzUx) (53)
= sgn

Uxz   UyzUx
Uy

(54)
= sgn(Uxz   UyzP (k)): (55)
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It is seen that equation (51) and equation (55) are identical.
The e¤ect of introducing exogenous social interaction on housing consumption
and location choice simply depends on the degree of substitutability between social
interaction and housing:
dx
dz
&
dk
dz
T 0 as @
@z
T 0 or as x; z are
8>>>><>>>>:
complements
unrelated
substitutes
9>>>>=>>>>; : (56)
There are two interesting cases to be examinedsocial interaction and housing
as complements or as substitutes. When social interaction and housing are com-
plements the introduction of social interaction into the model causes the individual
to move further away from the center of the city and consume more housing. This
e¤ect comprises a positive location e¤ect, or the change in location caused by so-
cial interaction, and a positive direct e¤ect, or the shift in housing demand caused
by social interaction. Intuitively, this individual consumes social interaction and
housing together, and social interaction is constant throughout the city. The indi-
vidual moves away from the center of the city in order to consume more housing.
Think about the family dinner parties or having friends and family visit the home
as socializing and housing consumed as complements.
Figure 5 explains the introduction of social interaction as complementary to
housing, Case 1. In the top panel the marginal benet of distance is shifted to the
right from an increase in housing demand. This alters the spatial equilibrium and
the individual moves further out from the CBD. In the lower panel, the direct ef-
fect from introducing social interaction is represented by the housing demand gradi-
ent shifting up, a movement from x0 to x1. The reinforcing location e¤ect is shown
as a movement along the new housing demand gradient until spatial equilibrium is
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Figure 5: Social Interaction and Housing as Complements, Case 1
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obtained, from x1 to x2. Figure 5 results in the individual moving further out and
consuming more housing in Case 1.
When social interaction and housing are substitutes, the individual moves closer
into the city and consumes less housing. The substitutes case yields a negative
location and direct e¤ect. The intuition for social interaction as a substitute for
housing is the individual consumes social interaction outside the home. This may
involve meeting friends for dinner at restaurants, going to bars, or joining clubs.
The individual consumes less housing and instead socializes.
Figure 6 provides a graphical description of the introduction of social interac-
tion as a substitute to housing, Case 2. The top panel shows a reduction in the
marginal benet of distance from the reduction in housing demand. This causes
the individual to move closer into the city. In the bottom panel, the direct e¤ect
caused by a reduction in housing demand in response to the introduction of substi-
tutable social interaction compounds the negative location e¤ect. Figure 6 states
the individual moves closer to the CBD and consumes less housing.
Endogenous Social Interaction While examining the e¤ects of introducing
exogenous social interaction is important, the reality is individuals choose location,
housing, and social interaction together. Social interaction is interesting in that
the individual does not consume interaction individually. The surroundings dictate
the level of social interaction that can potentially occur. In other words, social in-
teraction is endogenously determined along with location choice. Building on the
exogenous social interaction model, the following model denes social interaction
to be a function of otherschoices, in particular, lot size choice. The exogenous
model nds two interesting cases depending on the substitutability between housing
and social interaction. For simplicity, I assume that social interaction and housing
are complementary goods for the development of the endogenous social interaction
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Figure 6: Social Interaction and Housing as Substitues, Case 2
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model. The substitute goods case is discussed after the derivation of the models
results.
Social interaction enters the model as a constrained choice variable. The tech-
nology of social interaction is dened over the spatial structure of the neighborhood
such that the constraint describes the individuals level of social interaction given
the actions of a set of neighbors which reside in close proximity. The relationship
between neighborshousing choice in spatial equilibrium, ~x, and the individuals
social interaction, z(k), is not explicit in this model.
z(k) = f(~x(k)) (57)
The relationship between individuals social interaction and distance (or loca-
tion) is a¤ected in three distinct ways by otherslot size choice:
@z
@k
=
@f
@x
@~x
@k
)
@z
@k
T 0 as @f
@x
T 0: (58)
Since the housing demand gradient is known to increase with distance, a result seen
in both the base and exogenous social interaction models, the shape of the social
interaction gradient is determined by how density a¤ects social interaction. If an
increase in others(housing choice) lot size raises (density is reduced) the social
interaction enjoyed by the individual this implies social interaction increases with
distance (falls with an increase in density). If an increase in neighborslot size re-
duces the social interaction of the individual, then social interaction decreases with
distance (increases with an increase in density). The last possibility is simply the
exogenous case; an increase in neighborslot size has no e¤ect on the individuals
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social interaction. The endogenous social interaction model examines two impor-
tant sub-cases depending on the relationship between density and social interaction.
With the sub-cases dened, the objective function faced by the individual is
max
x;y;z;k
U(x; y; z) s:t: I = P (k)x+ y + T (k; I); z(k) = f(~x(k)): (59)
The individuals choice of x; y; z and k maximize the utility function subject to a
budget constraint and the social interaction constraint. In order to make the prob-
lem more tractable, I am going to optimize rst with a given distance, the same
technique used in the base model. The new problem becomes
max
x;y
U(x; y; z(k)) s:t: I = P (k)x+ y + T (k; I): (60)
With location held constant, the individual nds a reaction function in response
to neighborschoices of housing. I assume individuals in neighborhoods are identi-
cal;28 the Nash equilibrium that results is identical housing consumption choice for
all individuals in the neighborhood. The Nash solution for each distance is repre-
sented by, x^(k); thus, the social interaction constraint is altered to
z^(k) = f(x^(k)): (61)
Now that the problem is simplied, I can solve for the optimal choices of housing
and non-housing consumption given an arbitrary distance and level of social inter-
28This type of sorting based on social interaction can be supported by Helsely and Zenou
(2011).
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action. The rst order conditions are
Ux   P (k) = 0 (62)
Uy    = 0 (63)
I   T (k; I)  y   P (k)x = 0: (64)
These will guide the choice of x and y
x = (P (k); I   T (k; I); z^(k)) and y =  (P (k); I   T (k; I); z^(k)) (65)
Remember, given the optimal solution, I can nd the indirect utility function, V , as
follows
V [P (k); I T (k; I); z^(k)] = U [x(P (k); I T (k; I); z^(k)); y(P (k); I T (k; I); z^(k)); z^(k)]:
(66)
The individual chooses the optimal location by maximizing the indirect utility func-
tion directly.
max
k
V [P (k); I   T (k; I); z^(k)] (67)
The rst order condition for this maximization is
VPPk   VITk + Vz @z
@k
= 0: (68)
The rst order condition is simplied by using equations (27), (28) and that
Vz = Uz to nd Muths equation that denes spatial equilibrium,
 xPk + Uz

@z
@k
= Tk: (69)
Muths equation is altered from the exogenous model, but the solution to Muths
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equation, k, is the optimal distance where the marginal cost of distance (MCD) is
equal to the marginal benet of distance (MBD). Here the MBD includes a social
interaction component, (Uz=)(@z=@k); the e¤ect of this new element is determined
by the sign of the social interaction gradient. The sign of the social interaction
gradient follows the relationship between density and social interaction, or the as-
sumption made on the f function in the social interaction constraint. This implies
both important sub-cases need to be examined.
Muths equation describes the spatial equilibrium; however, I still need to nd
the e¤ect of endogenous social interaction on the housing demand gradient. The
housing demand in Nash equilibrium is shown in implicit form as
x^  (P (k); I   T (k); f(x^)) = 0: (70)
Using the Implicit Function Theorem, the housing demand gradient is
@x^
@k
=   
@
@P
Pk +
@
@I
Tk
1  @
@z
@f
@x^
(71)
Notice, the sign follows the numerator which is the exogenous social interaction re-
sult. This is because of Lipschitz condition that othersactions alter own actions
less than own actions alter own actions. In other words, the denominator is always
positive. The e¤ect on the housing demand gradient depends on the same sub-
cases as the other results.
Keep in mind I have assumed that social interaction and housing are comple-
mentary goods, case 1. I examine a positive relationship between housing and so-
cial interaction as the rst sub-case; in other words, sub-case A states
@z
@k
> 0 by
@f
@x
> 0: (72)
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In this case, Muths equation states the MBD shifts to the right from the previ-
ously exogenous social interaction result of spatial equilibrium, equation (69). The
housing demand gradient becomes steeper than in the exogenous social interaction
model, since the denominator of equation (71) is less than 1. Both of these e¤ects
lead to the individual moving further away from the center of the city, consuming
more housing and consuming more social interaction.
As before this is best seen in a series of graphs, Figure 7 shows Case 1-A. There
are now three panels to the gure: the top panel still describes the spatial equilib-
rium, the middle panel shows the housing demand gradient, and the bottom panel
illustrates the social interaction gradient. The top panel shows the MBD curve
shifting to the right caused by the increase in housing demand. The middle panel
shows an increase in the slope of the housing demand gradient, but the exogenous
models result still lies on the new housing demand gradient. The bottom panel
describes the social interaction gradient. In this case, social interaction increases
with distance. Figure 7 yields the individual moves further out and consumes more
housing and social interaction. In Case 1-A, the endogenous models predictions
reinforce the results of the exogenous model.
In sub-case B, social interaction and distance are negatively related.29
@z
@k
< 0 by
@f
@x
< 0: (73)
With this assumption, Muths equation nds the new spatial equilibrium closer to
the CBD from a shift left of the MBD curve. The housing demand gradient is at-
ter than in the exogenous social interaction model, and the social interaction gradi-
ent is downward slopping. Both of these e¤ects imply the individual moves closer to
the center of the city, consumes less housing and consuming more social interaction
29Put another way, social interaction and density are positively relatedas density rises, interac-
tion increases.
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Figure 7: Social Interaction and Housing as Complements; Social Interaction
Gradient Increasing, Case 1-A
65
compared to the exogenous case. Figure 8 shows the results for Case 1-B graphi-
cally; the results are contrasting from the exogenous model.
The remaining two possibilities deal with social interaction and housing as sub-
stitute goods, Case 2. The same two sub-cases, A and B, need to be examined.
In Case 2-A, social interaction and housing are substitutes and social interaction
increases with distance. In this case, the MBD curve shifts to the right, and the
housing demand gradient becomes steeper. The individual moves further out from
the CBD and consumes more housing and social interaction. The graphical repre-
sentation is identical to Figure 7. The predictions, however, contrast the exogenous
social interaction ndings for Case 2-A.
In Case 2-B, social interaction and housing are still substitutes but social inter-
action decreases with distance. Muths equations states the MBD curve shifts to
the left and the housing demand gradient becomes atter. This implies the indi-
vidual moves closer into the city and consumes less housing but more social inter-
action. Figure 8 shows this graphically, but the results for Case 2-B reinforce the
exogenous models predictions.
The next step is establishing, empirically, tests of these relationships. Luckily,
the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey provides data which allows me to
test these predictions.
Data and Empirical Specication
I use data from the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey (SCCBS)
which took place in 2000 and is distributed by the Roper Center for Public Opin-
ion Research at the University of Connecticut.30 This survey was designed by the
Saguaro Seminar at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard Univer-
sity with the intention of formulating a uniform measure of social capital. The
30Access to the unrestricted data can be found through www.roper.uconn.edu.
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Figure 8: Social Interaction and Housing as Complements; Social Interaction
Gradient Decreasing, Case 1-B
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data comprises a national sample as well as 41 separate "community" samples.
The national sample includes respondents who were chosen at random across the
Continental U.S. with over-sampling of blacks and Hispanics.31 As for the 41 "com-
munities," each separate community is dened spatially di¤erent; some are attempts
to capture a city, while others are entire states.32 Because the community samples
were sponsored by di¤erent institutions or individuals, the sampling techniques are
not uniform across the communities.33
The SCCBS data include social interaction measures that describe individuals
social activity within their communities. The theoretical model proposed suggests
the degree of substitutability between social interaction and housing a¤ects loca-
tion choice; however, data on individualspreferences for social interaction and
housing are not available. The SCCBS does provide information on socializing
at home and away from home. These data work as a proxy for the degree of sub-
stitutability between social interaction and housing. The respondents preference
proxy is generated from two variables in the survey, SocHome and SocPublic. The
SocHome variable is the frequency of having friends visit the home, while the vari-
able SocPublic is the frequency of socializing with friends in public places. These
data act as a revealed preference between social interaction and housing. If the in-
dividual chooses to socialize at home more often, then the individual has revealed a
preference for consuming housing and social interaction as complimentary goods.
On the other hand, if the respondent prefers to interact outside the home, then
housing and social interaction are consumed as substitute goods. The range for the
socializing data is from zero to sixty, intuitively this implies a range of socializing
31Blacks and Hispanics account for 500 respondents each which resulted in an additional 288
blacks and 294 Hispanics to be included in the sample than otherwise would have been.
32As an example, the Atlanta "community" is dened as several counties within the Atlanta
MSA where as the Indiana "community" is a random sample drawn across the entire state.
33There are several di¤erent sampling techniques used across the communities. One commu-
nity may sample heavier in Hispanics while another oversamples Native Americans. The sponsor
of the community sample may have been interested in a particular group of people and required
more information from that group.
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never to more than once a week.
The restricted use SCCBS provides each individuals location by the Census
tract (denoted tract(s) from here forward) for which the home is located. The in-
dividual response data is then aggregated up to the tract level using the sampling
weights provided. This generates a tract preference for the degree of substitutabil-
ity between social interaction and housing. Since the e¤ect on urban location deci-
sions is desired, the sample only includes tracts that intersects at any point with an
urbanized area. The Census Bureau denes an urbanized area as densely settled
territory which can include all or any size portion of the census tracts that make
up the urban area. Therefore, the data include tracts that lie in or signicantly
close to an urbanized area. This reduces the sample and brings the total obser-
vations to around 7800 tracts. These data are spread out over 276 Metropolitan
Areas (MSAs) and 301 di¤erent Urbanized Areas (UAs).
The 2000 U.S. Census data are merged by tract with the SCCBS data. The
Census data provides additional information at the tract level such as the number
of households with children, total housing units, median age, structural age dis-
tributions and other demographics. Most importantly, the population density for
each tract is supplied. This measure is used as the dependent variable in most of
the specications below; thus testing if the type of social interaction in the neigh-
borhood desired a¤ects population density. The population density is seen as a
combination of lot size and distance choice for the individual; thus, the models pre-
dictions are tested as the resulting relationships between both types of socializing
and population density.
Additional data are used to examine other outcomes besides population density.
The average time spent commuting to work data comes from the SCCBS. Straight
line distance data is generated from the center of each tract to the nearest CBD.
The CBD is approximated by a city hall or capital building for each urban area,
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and the area of each tract measured in square miles is also calculated.
Table 9 provides descriptive statistics of the data. In the sample, the average
census tracts population is characterized as being 69 percent white, 17 percent
black, 51 percent female, and 13 percent foreign born. The median age is just over
35 years and the median income is $49,000. The average tract has just under 2000
housing units with the vacancy rate at 6 percent, and 62 percent of units are owner
occupied. Table 9 also describes the social interaction data. The average tract so-
cializes more often at home rather than socializing in public. This gives an overall
indication of how social interaction may a¤ect city size and formation given the re-
sults of the new model. Commuting time is just under 30 minutes on average and
the average distance to the CBD is around 10 miles.
In the theoretical model, housing choice and location are both altered once so-
cial interaction is included. The empirical specication uses changes in tract pop-
ulation density to predict both of those changes simultaneously. The relationship
between population density and distance from the CBD is known to have an inverse
relationshipas distance increases, population density falls. Further, housing de-
manded is also known to have an inverse relationship with population densityas
housing demand rises (keeping amount of land available unchanged), population
density decreases. Thus, the predictions of the theoretical model can be seen by
realized choices of population densities from tracts with di¤ering preferences on so-
cializing at home or in public.
The primary empirical analysis of this paper is assessing the relationship be-
tween tract population density and two di¤erent types of social interaction activi-
ties. The general specication applied to the data is
Tractdeni = 1SocPublici + 2SocHomei + Xi + "i: (74)
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The dependent variable is the population density at the ith tract. The variable
SocPublici describes the tracts desire to socialize in public, where SocHomei cap-
tures the preference of social interaction at home. A host of controls, Xi, are in-
cluded in di¤erent specications. The controls comprise racial composition, median
age, gender composition, household structure (children present), median age of the
housing structures, percentage of foreign born residents, and median income. I es-
timate equation (74) for all tracts that lie inside an urban area using ordinary least
squares (OLS) framework.
Results
Table 10 presents four di¤erent specications for determining the relationship
between social interaction and population density. The rst specication is the
base model. The dependent variable is tract population density which is only ex-
plained by the two forms of social interaction, SocPublic and SocHome. The re-
lationships are exactly what is predicted by the theoretical model. As preference
for interaction in public increases, so does the population density of the tract. This
implies individuals move in closer to the CBD and consume less housing. The op-
posite e¤ect is found between socializing at home and population density. An in-
crease in the social interaction at home reduces the population density of the tract.
This suggests individuals who prefer consuming social interaction and housing as
compliments move further out and consumer more housing. The base model re-
sults are strongly statistically signicant. The magnitudes may appear small; yet,
as the tract desires one more public interaction over a year, the tract population
density increases by 0.63 percent. At the average density, this increase corresponds
to an additional 42 people per square mile. In perspective, this change is not trivial
for one additional interaction at the average. The magnitude is roughly half and
working in the opposite direction for an additional interaction at home. The ex-
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planatory power of the base model specication is low with an R2 of only 0.005.
The second specication is the base model with xed e¤ects for Census divisions.
The inclusion of these xed e¤ects removes unobserved regional di¤erences from
the estimated relationships. The results are again consistent with the theoretical
prediction and are strongly statistically signicant. The magnitude of the esti-
mated relationship between social interaction at home and population density is
increased, where the relationship for socializing in public is reduced. The resulting
R2 is much larger, 0.127.
The remaining two specications are the plus model and the plus with xed
e¤ects model. These models include other control variables omitted in the base
models. The plus model and plus with xed e¤ects model results, shown in Table
10, are aligned with the theoretically predicted outcomes; however, the statistical
signicance is lost on the socializing at home relationship. The magnitudes for
both social interaction relationships are reduced as well. The control variable re-
sults are mainly as expected. Younger residents reside in higher density areas; the
presence of children in the family structure reduces the population density. The
older the housing structures the greater the population density. Foreign born resi-
dents choose higher density areas, and as income increases (controlling for age and
family structure) so does population density of the tract. As expected, the good-
ness of t is increased with the addition of more controls: 0.557 for the plus model
and 0.579 for the plus with xed e¤ects model.
The OLS results above suggest when there is preference for socializing at home,
individuals reside in tracts that have much lower population densities, and when so-
cializing is substitutable for housing individuals choose higher density tracts. The
theoretical models predictions do not directly state a choice of population density,
so as an alternative specication other dependent variables are used. The straight-
line distance between the center of the tract and the CBD, average commuting
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Table 10: E¤ects of Di¤erent Social Interactions on Tract Population Density
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Tract Population Density Base Base w/ FE Plus Plus w/ FE
Socializing in Public 0.0063*** 0.0056*** 0.0017** 0.0014**
[4.162] [4.614] [2.209] [2.060]
Socializing at Home -0.0029** -0.0034*** -0.0003 -0.0007
[-2.593] [-3.394] [-0.445] [-0.975]
Percentage of Whitesy -0.6353* 0.0294
[-1.814] [0.072]
Percentage of Blacksy -0.0677 0.7472**
[-0.188] [2.009]
Median Age -0.1290*** -0.1077***
[-7.323] [-8.285]
Median Age Squared 0.0009*** 0.0007***
[4.740] [4.512]
Percentage of Females 7.3505*** 7.6405***
[8.962] [9.539]
Percentage of Households -2.7872*** -2.7366***
with Children [-12.881] [-10.124]
Median Structure Age -0.0313*** -0.0296***
[-12.991] [-17.282]
Percentage of Foreign Born 3.9099*** 4.3819***
Residents [9.934] [13.711]
Median Income 0.0083*** 0.0073***
[4.177] [3.454]
Constant 8.0480*** 8.0700*** 69.4930*** 65.0162***
[64.520] [92.877] [15.833] [19.143]
Includes Census Division Dummies No Yes No Yes
Observations 7,659 7,659 7,659 7,659
R-squared 0.005 0.127 0.557 0.579
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the urban area (190 clusters). T-statistics in brackets.
*, **, *** denotes signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
yThe joint F-test is signicant at the 1% level for the percentage of whites and Blacks in a tract.
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Table 11: E¤ects of Di¤erent Social Interactions on Distance From Central Busi-
ness District
Dependent Variable : (1) (2) (3) (4)
Distance of Tract to CBD Base Base w/ FE Plus Plus w/ FE
Socializing in Public -0.0133 -0.0167** 0.0037 -0.0020
[-1.574] [-2.391] [0.509] [-0.373]
Socializing at Home -0.0037 0.0053 -0.0073 -0.0023
[-0.586] [0.828] [-1.296] [-0.434]
Percentage of Whitesy 11.3102** 10.9753***
[2.458] [5.811]
Percentage of Blacksy 10.6193** 5.7873***
[2.273] [2.794]
Median Age -0.0772 -0.1443
[-0.718] [-1.425]
Median Age Squared 0.0019 0.0024*
[1.385] [1.684]
Percentage of Females 7.3368** 6.7699*
[2.201] [1.713]
Percentage of Married 23.1194*** 23.5264***
Households with Children [8.282] [10.385]
Median Structure Age 0.1107*** 0.1587***
[7.028] [8.467]
Percentage of Vacant Units 5.1731 11.1205***
[1.141] [2.764]
Percentage of Foreign Born 10.6026*** -6.6896**
Residents [3.259] [-2.526]
Median Income 0.0163 -0.0494***
[1.219] [-5.076]
Constant 9.4580*** 9.3191*** -228.9784*** -315.0841***
[14.073] [82.646] [-7.666] [-8.563]
Includes MSA Dummies No Yes No Yes
Observations 7659 7659 7659 7659
R-squared 0.001 0.271 0.281 0.564
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the urban area (190 clusters). T-statistics in brackets.
*, **, *** denotes signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
yThe joint F-test is signicant at the 1% level for the percentage of whites and Blacks in a tract.
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Table 12: E¤ects of Di¤erent Social Interactions on Average Commute Times of
Census Tract
Dependent Variable : (1) (2) (3) (4)
Avg. Commute Time of Tract Base Base w/ FE Plus Plus w/ FE
Socializing in Public -0.0081 -0.0110*** -0.0050 -0.0053*
[-1.607] [-2.977] [-1.289] [-1.784]
Socializing at Home -0.0097** 0.0010 0.0013 0.0030
[-2.188] [0.310] [0.382] [1.099]
Percentage of Whitesy 2.1676 0.0468
[0.782] [0.027]
Percentage of Blacksy 11.6852*** 5.8267***
[3.422] [3.096]
Median Age 0.1823 0.1960**
[1.251] [1.997]
Median Age Squared -0.0017 -0.0021
[-0.904] [-1.545]
Percentage of Females 6.3042 6.6740*
[1.037] [1.673]
Percentage of Married 15.3755*** 19.4652***
Households with Children [6.283] [7.546]
Median Structure Age 0.0079 0.0480***
[0.389] [4.126]
Percentage of Vacant Units 0.2815 4.8869**
[0.089] [2.443]
Percentage of Foreign Born 17.6908*** -1.6920
Residents [4.387] [-1.053]
Median Income 0.0190 -0.0578***
[1.404] [-4.794]
Constant 26.7376*** 26.5540*** -6.6871 -78.1346***
[38.454] [377.629] [-0.183] [-3.463]
Includes MSA Dummies No Yes No Yes
Observations 7659 7659 7659 7659
R-squared 0.002 0.512 0.275 0.632
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the urban area (190 clusters). T-statistics in brackets.
*, **, *** denotes signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
yThe joint F-test is signicant at the 1% level for the percentage of whites and Blacks in a tract.
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Table 13: E¤ects of Di¤erent Social Interactions on Square Miles of Census Tract
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Square Miles of Tract Base Base w/ FE Plus Plus w/ FE
Socializing in Public -0.0512*** -0.0418*** -0.0190 -0.0182
[-2.896] [-2.766] [-1.437] [-1.466]
Socializing at Home 0.0358** 0.0231 0.0235 0.0168
[2.334] [1.430] [1.628] [1.129]
Percentage of Whites -21.0659 -19.2216
[-0.770] [-0.723]
Percentage of Blacks -25.1639 -21.3965
[-0.888] [-0.807]
Median Age 0.5947** 0.2011
[2.181] [0.924]
Median Age Squared -0.0019 0.0028
[-0.608] [0.899]
Percentage of Females -56.6902*** -64.9381***
[-3.691] [-3.686]
Percentage of Married 35.6555*** 35.2218***
Households with Children [5.717] [5.559]
Median Structure Age 0.1691*** 0.1754***
[5.768] [3.954]
Percentage of Vacant Units 58.3156** 53.6742**
[2.475] [2.439]
Percentage of Foreign Born -37.2229 -38.4884
Residents [-1.276] [-1.413]
Median Income -0.1115*** -0.0860**
[-2.917] [-2.038]
Constant 5.2391*** 5.3596*** -298.9421*** -301.7191***
[5.890] [14.088] [-6.384] [-4.516]
Includes MSA Dummies No Yes No Yes
Observations 7659 7659 7659 7659
R-squared 0.001 0.090 0.038 0.117
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the urban area (190 clusters). T-statistics in brackets.
*, **, *** denotes signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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time, and area (measured in square miles) are used as dependent variables. Table
11 shows the straight-line distance results. The only statistically signicant result
is a negative relationship between socializing in public and distance found in the
base model with xed e¤ects (specication (2)). Table 12 displays the results using
the average commuting times (a proxy for true distance to the CBD) for the tract
as the dependent variable. The results are mostly as expected; socializing in pub-
lic is negatively related with commuting time, where socializing at home leads to
increased commuting times. In the base model, the relationship between socializ-
ing at home and commuting time, however, is negative and statistically signicant.
The relationship between social interaction and tract area is shown in Table 13.
Again, the results follow expectation. The preference for socializing in public is
associated with smaller tracts, and socializing with friends at home is done more of-
ten in larger tracts. The base model exhibits statistical signicance for both forms
of interaction, while in the base model with xed e¤ects, only the socializing in
public result is statistically signicant. The plus and plus with xed e¤ects mod-
els yield no statistically signicant relationships for the socializing variables.
I also examine a closer look at a few particular urban areas. Table 14 shows
the relationship between tract population density and both variables of interest for:
Chicago, IL; Gary, IN; Grand Rapids, MI; Los Angeles, CA; and Washington D.C.
Only the base and plus models are used since there is no census division variation.
While not all results are statistically signicant, the relationships are as the theo-
retical model predicts. These results suggest the location choice within urban areas
also is a¤ected by social interactions.
Instrumental Variables Approach
The causal relationship between social interaction and population density is hard
to distinguish. Is social interaction a function of density or is density a function
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of social interaction? The answer is likely "yes" to both. This is the classic simul-
taneity issue. The results above state the simple correlations if simultaneity is ig-
nored. The next step is to examine a causal relationship between location choice
and social interaction. An instrumental variables approach is used to establish
causality. In the rst stage, both socializing in public, SocPublic, and socializing
at home, SocHome, are determined by two instruments. The rst instrument is
an indicator of television being the primary form of entertainment for the respon-
dent. The intuition is that if individuals spend time watching television they are
not socializing with friends. The second instrument is the amount of time spent on
the internet. Keep in mind, these data are from the year 2000, and while the in-
ternet was widely available in all urban areas at that time, the activities on the in-
ternet were limited to chatting with or e-mailing friends and family. The intuition
is that the more socially active respondents are the more time is spent chatting or
e-mailing on the internet Both instrument data come from the SCCBS and are ag-
gregated in the same method as the interaction data.
The rst stage estimations are shown as
SocInteractioni = 1Televisioni + 2Interneti + Xi + i: (75)
Since there are two endogenous regressors and two instruments, the rst stage is ex-
actly identied. The variable SocInteraction represents either socializing in public
or socializing at home, and the two instruments are Television and Internet. The
same control variables are used in plus and plus xed e¤ects model for the instru-
mental variables technique and are represented by the vector X. The second stage
is then estimated as
Tractdeni = 1
^SocPublici + 2 ^SocHomei + Xi + i: (76)
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Table 15: An IV Approach on the E¤ects of Social Interactions on Tract Popula-
tion Density: Base Model
First Stage First Stage Second Stage
Dependent Variable : Sochome Socpub Tract Density
Televison is Primary Form of -1.1169*** -1.9966*** .
Entertainment [-6.683] [-11.062]
Weekly Internet Usage 0.4368*** 0.4150*** .
[7.791] [7.312]
Socializing in Public . . 0.0860***
[2.743]
Socializing at Home . . -0.0730***
[-3.040]
Constant 18.1930*** 25.4309*** 8.2429
[37.053] [48.522] [45.011]
Includes MSA Dummies No No No
Observations 7637 7637 7637
F-Test Statistic 60.98 100.63 .
Wald Chi-Squared Test Statistic 9.75
R-squared 0.022 0.033 .
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the urban area (190 clusters). T-statistics in brackets.
*, **, *** denotes signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 16: An IV Approach on the E¤ects of Social Interactions on Tract Popula-
tion Density: Full Model
First Stage First Stage Second Stage
Dependent Variable : Sochome Socpub Tract Density
Televison is Primary Form of -1.8867*** -1.0932*** .
Entertainment [-10.23] [-6.43]
Weekly Internet Usage 0.4085*** 0.4218*** .
[7.13] [7.49]
Socializing in Public . . 0.0451**
[2.471]
Socializing at Home . . -0.0288**
[-2.016]
Percentage of Whites 4.9415 3.4661 0.1750
[1.40] [1.04] [0.375]
Percentage of Blacks 0.8064 0.3440 0.5377
[0.22] [0.10] [1.180]
Median Age -0.2345 -0.1604 -0.0781***
[-1.27] [-0.90] [-5.192]
Median Age Squared 0.0004 -0.0013 0.0005***
[0.20] [-0.61] [2.687]
Percentage of Females 2.3308 6.9408 6.3233***
[0.32] [1.01] [7.319]
Percentage of Married -5.6144* -15.2620*** -2.8233***
Households with Children [-1.93] [-5.68] [-6.470]
Median Structure Age 0.0184 0.0103 0.0282***
[1.12] [0.68] [16.074]
Percentage of Foreign Born -5.1462 2.4862 4.3261***
Residents [-1.49] [0.75] [11.494]
Median Income 0.0034 0.0252** 0.0091***
[0.26] [2.00] [3.668]
Constant 28.7916*** 20.1605*** 5.0806***
[4.66] [3.33] [7.039]
Includes Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7637 7637 7637
F-Test Statistic 14.75 12.96 .
Wald Chi-Squared Test Statistic 2194.62
R-squared 0.042 0.036 .
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the urban area (190 clusters). T-statistics in brackets.
*, **, *** denotes signicance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 15 shows the rst and second stage results for the base model. The in-
struments are statistically signicantly related to social interaction in the expected
ways. Television as the primary form of entertainment reduces the socializing be-
haviors, where internet usage increases both socializing at home and socializing in
public. The second stage results are as the theoretical model predicts; tract density
is positively related with socializing in public and negatively related with socializing
at home. The magnitudes are much larger than in the OLS base model, shown in
Table 10. The results suggest an increase in socializing in public once more during
a year leads to an increase in tract population density of 8.6 percent At the aver-
age population density this implies an increase of 572 people per square mile. The
socializing at home result indicates a reduction in population density by 486 people.
Table 16 shows the full model results.
Conclusions
This paper develops a theoretical framework that examines the e¤ect of intro-
ducing exogenous and endogenous forms of social interaction into the choices of
housing and location. The exogenous social interaction model results suggest the
degree of substitutability between social interaction and housing determines the ef-
fect on location and housing choice. The endogenous model builds upon this and
nds either reinforcing or contracting e¤ects depending on the relationship between
social interaction and density. I then test these predictions using simple empirical
methods which provide support for the theoretical results.
The implications of this paper, along with the growing literature on social inter-
action, is that informal interaction or face-to-face meetings among friends, neigh-
bors, and family are important in determining the shape and size of urban areas.
Social interaction, whether compliments or substitutes to housing and whether in-
creasing or decreasing with density, does e¤ect the location and housing choices.
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4 CONCLUSION
This dissertation consists of two essays. The rst essay examines the relation-
ship between social interaction and population density. I recognize the endogeneity
concerns with social interaction and population density and use instrumental vari-
ables to get causal inferences. The instrumental variables include geological data
on seismic hazard, landslide hazard, and the presence of sedimentary rock beneath
the soil. I use this exogenous variation in the geological data to predict changes in
local population density through impacts on building high density structures. The
instruments allow me to examine the causal link between increases in local popu-
lation density and social interaction. The results suggest social interaction with
friends increases with local population density where interaction with neighbors
declines with increases in density. Group involvement is seen to be una¤ected by
changes in density. Index measures of social interaction show various results imply-
ing the type of social interaction is important for determining the relationship with
density.
The second chapter looks more closely at the theoretical approach to under-
standing how social interaction a¤ects the urban consumer. I add social interac-
tion into the Alonso-Muth model, a standard theoretical model in urban economics.
The new model produces several cases and sub-cases depending on the type of so-
cial interaction that is being portrayed. The model is exible in that social inter-
action can be exogenously or endogenously determined, increase or decrease with
density, or be a complement or substitute with housing consumption. The main
nding of the model is that when social interaction is consumed as a substitute for
housing, individuals move closer in to the center of the city and consume less hous-
ing; whereas, when social interaction and housing are complement goods, individu-
als will move further away from the center of the city and consume more housing.
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Lastly, I test these predictions of the model with empirical methods and data. It is
shown that the individual who reveals a preference for social interaction inside the
home lives in lower density areas of the city (an implication of moving further out
and consuming more housing). When the individual prefers to interact outside the
home he lives in higher density areas of the city (an implication of moving closer in
and consuming less housing). The results are in support of the models predictions.
These essays have wide-ranging implications in urban economics. Understand-
ing how social interaction occurs is fairly new to the literature, and mapping the
di¤erences in social interaction preferences across density is valuable. If social in-
teraction is the mechanism for dissemination of information on potential job oppor-
tunities, or for crime deterrents in neighborhoods through a neighborhood watch
group, then examining what the relationship between the density and interaction
level becomes important. Further, policy makers and urban planners are interested
in how urban areas grow and evolve. As the continual wave of technology advances
the types of social interaction and method of social interaction may change. There-
fore, the theoretical understanding of how individuals will relocate and alter their
housing demand preferences as changes in social interaction begin to take place is
quite important when developing urban renewal or revitalization plans. All in all,
the studies presented in this dissertation aim at informing the signicance social
interaction has on economic decision making in an urban environment.
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